

**UConn**

INSTITUTE FOR MUNICIPAL  
AND REGIONAL POLICY



**CONNECTICUT  
STATE POLICE**  
TRAFFIC STOP DATA  
AUDIT REPORT  
2014-21

*JUNE 2023*

# AUTHORS

**Ken Barone**

Associate Director  
Institute for Municipal and Regional Policy  
School of Public Policy  
University of Connecticut

**Matthew B. Ross, Ph.D.**

Associate Professor  
School of Public Policy & Urban Affairs and Department of Economics  
Northeastern University

# CONTRIBUTORS

**Dr. Vaughn Crichlow**

Director of Research and Associate Research Professor  
Institute for Municipal and Regional Policy  
School of Public Policy  
University of Connecticut

**James Fazzalano**

Senior Research and Policy Analyst  
Institute for Municipal and Regional Policy  
School of Public Policy  
University of Connecticut

**Renee LaMark Muir**

Senior Research and Policy Analyst  
Institute for Municipal and Regional Policy  
School of Public Policy  
University of Connecticut

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables.....	i
List of Figures.....	ii
CTRP3 Mission Statement.....	iv
Introduction.....	1
I. Background .....	3
I.A: About the Connecticut State Police .....	3
I.B: Traffic Stop Data Collection System .....	5
I.C: Brief Overview of CT’s Citation System .....	7
II. Timeline of Events .....	8
III. Summary of the Audit Methodology.....	14
IV. Audit Findings (Troopers) .....	19
IV.A. Audit of Overreported and Inaccurate Racial Profiling Records.....	20
IV.A.1: Summary of Overreported Racial Profiling Records by Troop.....	23
IV.A.2: Identifying Troopers with Overreported Records.....	25
IV.B. Audit of Underreported Racial Profiling Records.....	29
IV.B.1: Summary of Underreported CIB Records by Troop.....	32
IV.B.2: Identifying Troopers with Underreported Records.....	34
IV.C. Impact on Racial Profiling Reports .....	38
V. Audit Findings (Constables).....	41
V.A. Audit of Overreported Racial Profiling Records .....	44
V.A.1: Summary of Overreported Racial Profiling Records by Troop Jurisdiction .....	46
V.A.2: Identifying Constables with Overreported Records.....	47
V.B. Audit of Underreported Racial Profiling Records .....	52
V.C. Impact on Racial Profiling Reports.....	53
VI. Conclusions and Recommendations .....	54
VI.A: Summary of Trooper Audit Findings .....	55
VI.B: Summary of Constable Audit Findings .....	56
VI.C: Summary of Impact on Racial Profiling Reports .....	57
VI.D: Recommendations.....	58
Appendix A: Trooper Analysis Figures.....	62
Appendix B: Constable Analysis Figures.....	69

# LIST OF TABLES

## IV. Audit Findings (Troopers)

Table 4. 1: Number of Troopers with Overreported Racial Profiling Records .....	25
Table 4. 2: Number of Troopers with Underreported Records .....	34

## V. Audit Findings (Constables)

Table 5. 1: Example of Descriptive Methodology .....	41
Table 5. 2: Number of Constables with Overreported Racial Profiling Records .....	48

# LIST OF FIGURES

## III. Summary of Audit Methodology

Figure 3. 1: Outline of Matching Process .....	18
--	----

## IV. Audit Findings (Troopers)

Figure 4. 1: Total Number of Stops by Disposition.....	19
Figure 4. 2: Number of Troopers submitting records to RP System .....	20
Figure 4. 3: Characteristics of Matched and Unmatched Records.....	21
Figure 4. 4: Racial Profiling Records with Multiple Errors by Year (Ratio) .....	21
Figure 4. 5: Racial Profiling Records with Multiple Errors by Troop (Ratio).....	21
Figure 4. 6: Overreported Racial Profiling Records by Year (Ratio) .....	22
Figure 4. 7: Overreported and Inaccurate Racial Profiling Records by Troop (Ratio) .....	23
Figure 4. 8: Annual Overreported Racial Profiling Records for Identified Troopers .....	26
Figure 4. 9: Number of Troopers Identified by Year.....	27
Figure 4. 10: Number of Years a Trooper was Identified with Significant Discrepancies.....	27
Figure 4. 11: Percent of Overreported Infractions by Trooper .....	28
Figure 4. 12: Number of Troopers Identified by Year (Combined Criteria).....	29
Figure 4. 13: Number of Years a Trooper was Identified with Significant Discrepancies (Combined Criteria) .....	29
Figure 4. 14: Underreported CIB Records by Year (Ratio).....	31
Figure 4. 15: Underreported CIB Records by Troop (Ratio) .....	32
Figure 4. 16: Annual Underreported Records for Identified Troopers .....	35
Figure 4. 17: Number of Troopers Identified by Year .....	35
Figure 4. 18: Number of Years a Trooper was Identified with Significant Discrepancies.....	36
Figure 4. 19: Percent of Underreported Infractions by Trooper .....	36
Figure 4. 20: Number of Troopers Identified by Year (Combined Criteria).....	37
Figure 4. 21: Number of Years a Trooper was Identified with Discrepancies (Combined Criteria).....	37
Figure 4. 22: Unmatched Racial Profiling Records by Hour .....	38
Figure 4. 23: Unmatched Racial Profiling Records by Race and Ethnicity.....	39
Figure 4. 24: Unmatched CIB Records by Race and Ethnicity.....	39
Figure 4. 25: Estimated Change to Racial and Ethnic Composition of Traffic Stops .....	40

## V. Audit Findings (Constables)

Figure 5. 1: Total Number of Stops by Disposition.....	43
Figure 5. 2: Number of Constables submitting records to RP System .....	43
Figure 5. 3: Total Number of Constables Submitting Racial Profiling Records in towns within Troop Boundaries .....	44
Figure 5. 4: Overreported Racial Profiling Records by Year (Ratio) .....	45
Figure 5. 5: Overreported Racial Profiling Records by Troop (Ratio).....	46
Figure 5. 6: Annual Unmatched Racial Profiling Records for Identified Constables .....	48
Figure 5. 7: Number of Constables Identified by Year.....	49
Figure 5. 8: Number of Years a Constable was Identified with Significant Discrepancies .....	50

Figure 5. 9: Percent of Overreported Infractions by Constable.....	50
Figure 5. 10: Number of Constables Identified by Year (Combined Criteria) .....	51
Figure 5. 11: Number of Years a Constable was Identified with Significant Discrepancies (Combined Criteria) .....	51
Figure 5. 12: Underreported CIB Records by Year (Ratio).....	52

# CTRP3 MISSION STATEMENT

This mission statement was written by an ad-hoc committee of the Connecticut Racial Profiling Prohibition Project advisory board and endorsed unanimously by the board on December 6, 2018.

1. Racial Profiling has historically occurred and continues to occur throughout America.
2. The Alvin W. Penn Racial Profiling Law enacted by the Connecticut General Assembly in 1999 required state and local police to collect traffic stop data and report the data to the state.
3. The 2011 federal investigation into the East Haven Police Department brought this issue to the forefront in Connecticut again and led to the Connecticut General Assembly updating the Profiling Legislation in 2012.
4. Disparities across racial and ethnic groups occur in traffic stops in Connecticut.
5. Enforcing the law's data reporting requirement and collecting and analyzing racial disparities in traffic stop records is the primary charge of the advisory board.
  - a. A broader analysis, utilizing multiple methodologies in the preferred method for measuring for the presence of racial disparities in traffic enforcement;
  - b. Although no measure is 100% accurate in measuring disparities, the analysis utilized in Connecticut is sufficient in determining the presence of disparities;
  - c. We will continue to modify and refine our methodologies based on the best available research and accepted practices in the field.
6. We will take a proactive approach in understanding, explaining and addressing disparities found in the analysis by:
  - a. Utilizing input from all stakeholders to understand the underlying causes for such disparities;
  - b. Clearly explaining to the public and stakeholders if there are justifiable reasons for such disparities;
  - c. Reporting to the Office of Policy and Management instances where the Connecticut Racial Profiling Prohibition Project Advisory Board believes that a police department is in violation of the Alvin W. Penn law.

# INTRODUCTION

The law enforcement profession demands that officers maintain a high level of integrity, competence, and professionalism. Trust between law enforcement and the communities they serve is the bedrock of any legitimate criminal justice system. Public trust exists only when the police execute their duties with fairness, equity, professionalism, and rigor.<sup>1</sup> Breaches of integrity occur when conflicting interests are incorrectly or inappropriately weighed against each other and a police officer violates or oversteps the legitimate interests of the department and/or community.<sup>2</sup> When an individual police officer's integrity is compromised, the entire police department, and perhaps in the largest sense the entire criminal justice system, is compromised and the public's trust is damaged.

Police officers have broad discretion in constructing their reports and reporting evidence. Through their reports and other legal documents (e.g., arrest warrants, search and seizure warrants, evidence logs, misdemeanor summons, traffic citations, etc.) the police have fundamental control over the construction of the 'facts' for a case that establishes a framework from which the prosecutor, the judge, the defense lawyer must work. This control depends upon the faith that police reports are basically objective, truthful, and reliable. False reports, therefore, undermine this trust.<sup>3</sup>

Law enforcement has for many years used data to track information such as crime, calls for service, traffic stops, etc. and for administrative purposes such as officer evaluations. Departments have recognized that good data collection can improve training, oversight and even hiring practices. It can also be utilized to engender trust among law enforcement and the public they serve. "The statistical evaluation of policing data in Connecticut is an important step towards developing a transparent dialogue between law enforcement and the public at large."<sup>4</sup>

First enacted in 1999, Connecticut's anti-racial profiling law entitled, the Alvin W. Penn Racial Profiling Prohibition Act (Public Act 99-198), prohibits any law enforcement agency from stopping, detaining, or searching any motorist when the stop is motivated solely by considerations of the race, color, ethnicity, age, gender or sexual orientation of that individual (Connecticut General Statutes Sections 54-11 and 54-1m). In 2012 and 2013, the Connecticut General Assembly made several changes to this law to allow for an improved system better able to address racial profiling concerns in Connecticut. The law also charged the Office of Policy and Management (OPM) with analyzing the stop data each year and filing an annual report to the governor and General Assembly on compliance with the law.

In 2012, the Racial Profiling Prohibition Project Advisory Board (CTRP3) was established to advise OPM in adopting the law's standardized methods and guidelines. The Institute for Municipal and Regional Policy (IMRP) at UConn was tasked by OPM to help oversee the design, evaluation, and management of the racial profiling study mandated by PA 12-74 and PA 13-75, "An Act Concerning

---

<sup>1</sup> S. Gaffigan, P. McDonald, National Institute of Justice and the Office of Community Orientated Policing Services, *Police Integrity: Public Service with Honor* (January 1997)

<sup>2</sup> Kaptein and Reenen, *Integrity Management of Police Organizations*, International Journal of Police Strategies and Management, 2001

<sup>3</sup> S.Z. Fisher, Boston University School of Law, *Just the Facts, Ma'am: Lying and the Omission of Exculpatory Evidence in Police Reports*, Fall 1993

<sup>4</sup> Racial Profiling Prohibition Project, *Traffic Stop Data Analysis and Findings, 2018* (Released May 2020)



Traffic Stop Information.” The IMRP worked with the advisory board and all appropriate parties to enhance and modernize the collection and analysis of traffic stop data in Connecticut.

Beginning October 1, 2013, all police agencies in the state with the authority to enforce traffic laws were statutorily required to submit traffic stop data for analysis under the new methods outlined by OPM. The state’s Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) serves as the repository for the collection of consistent and universal traffic stop data across all agencies monthly. Not only do project staff have access to this data for purposes of implementing the law’s requirements, but the advisory board has also ensured the data is available publicly via the [internet](#). The reliability of traffic stop data sent to CJIS is primarily dependent upon the accuracy of police officers in recording and reporting their respective stop data.

The amended Penn Act also authorizes the OPM secretary to order appropriate penalties (i.e., the withholding of state funds) when municipal police departments, the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection (DESPP), and other police departments fail to comply with the law’s requirements.

In August 2022, Hearst Connecticut Media reported that four state police troopers were investigated by their department in 2018 for falsifying traffic citation records (commonly referred to as traffic “tickets”.) These allegations were extremely concerning to the CTRP3 advisory board because it appeared likely that these fabricated records were being submitted to Connecticut’s racial profiling data collection system. The advisory board wanted to determine the extent to which any racial profiling records fabricated by these troopers or possibly others may have introduced unreliability in the data being used to analyze the state police generally and individual troop barracks.

The advisory board was further concerned that it was never notified by the Connecticut State Police of the potentially falsified records. A timely notification could have helped researchers ensure that due diligence was done regarding the quality of data being analyzed and reported by researchers. The advisory board, therefore, initiated an inquiry that ultimately led to a comprehensive audit of the state police data.

We understand that there may be broader implications and ramifications that could result from the falsification of official records. Connecticut takes compliance with the Alvin W. Penn law seriously, evidenced by the fact that an intentional violation of the law is grounds for police decertification. This report will outline in a comprehensive and transparent manner our detailed audit findings for both state police troopers and constables under limited state police jurisdiction with the sole purpose of determining what issues caused inaccuracies in state police data already collected, the extent of the inaccuracies, and what remains to be resolved to ensure the reported data remains accurate going forward.


# I. BACKGROUND

## I.A: ABOUT THE CONNECTICUT STATE POLICE

The Connecticut State Police not only provide enforcement on Connecticut interstate highways and state roads but are also responsible for local policing services for 80 towns. Of the 80 towns patrolled by State Police, 57 contract with the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection (DESPP) for one or more resident state troopers. CSP also includes specialized investigative units (statewide organized crime investigative task force, statewide narcotics task force, casino unit, welfare fraud unit, and criminal intelligence unit,) specialized tactical units (emergency services that include aviation, bomb squad, SCUBA dive team, the canine unit, tactical unit/SWAT, and mass transit security explosive detection unit) and administrative units (licensing and permits section, forensic laboratory, photography, and identification unit, polygraph unit, and the training division.)

CSP divides the state into three districts (Central, Eastern, and Western) and 11 troops. Each district oversees several troops, and troops typically cover multiple towns. The CSP headquarters houses the command and administrative staff for the division. Figure 1.1 depicts the boundaries of each district and the 11 troops. The general town location of each troop barracks and district headquarters are listed in Table 1.1.

**Figure 1. 1: Connecticut State Police District and Troop Map**



Source of Map: Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, Connecticut State Police

**Table 1. 1: Town Location for Troop Barracks and District Barracks**

District/Troop	Location
CSP Headquarters	Middletown
Central District	Hartford
Eastern District	Colchester
Western District	Litchfield
Troop A	Southbury
Troop B	Canaan
Troop C	Tolland
Troop D	Danielson
Troop E	Montville
Troop F	Westbrook
Troop G	Bridgeport
Troop H	Hartford
Troop I	Bethany
Troop K	Colchester
Troop L	Litchfield

Individual troop barracks are overseen by a command staff structure comprised of a troop commander (lieutenant), master sergeant, and patrol sergeants and are staffed by detectives, troopers, and troopers first class in addition to administrative, dispatch, and other ancillary staff. Troops are primarily responsible for patrolling interstate and state highways, routes, and roads and providing general policing services, and assisting local police departments. In 2021, the Connecticut State Police employed 885 sworn personnel of all ranks. There are factors that impact the number of CSP sworn personnel in a given year, but those will not be addressed in this report.

In addition to the troop barracks, there are 169 municipalities in Connecticut and 94 have organized police departments. Pursuant to state law (CGS §29-5), a municipality that does not have an organized police department may enter a renewable two-year contract with DESPP for resident state troopers. The resident state trooper is a state police officer that has been assigned by the Commissioner of DESPP to the contracted town. The resident trooper is responsible for supervising any constables that may be hired by the town. Although resident troopers supervise and direct the operations of town constables, the constables are local employees and not state police officers. There are 54 towns that utilize the resident trooper program. Policing services for towns without a municipal police department or resident trooper program are provided by the local state police troop. Table 1.2 highlights the towns that participate in the resident trooper program and the number of resident troopers assigned to the town. Table 1.3 highlights the total number of constables by town and troop.

**Table 1. 2: Connecticut Towns with Resident State Troopers**

Town	# of Resident Troopers	Town	# of Resident Troopers	Town	# of Resident Troopers
Andover	1	Ellington	5	North Canaan	1
Barkhamsted	1	Essex*	1	No. Stonington	2
Beacon Falls	1	Griswold	2	Old Lyme*	1
Bethany	1	Haddam	2	Oxford*	7

Town	# of Resident Troopers	Town	# of Resident Troopers	Town	# of Resident Troopers
Bethlehem	1	Harwinton	2	Preston	2
Bolton	2	Hebron*	2	Prospect*	1
Bridgewater**	½	Kent	1	Roxbury**	½
Brooklyn	1	Killingly	4	Salem	2
Burlington*	1	Killingworth	1	Salisbury*	1
Chaplin	1	Lebanon*	1	Sherman	1
Chester*	1	Lisbon	1	Somers*	3
Colchester*	1	Litchfield*	1	Southbury*	1
Columbia	1	Mansfield*	8	Sprague	1
Deep River*	1	Marlborough*	1	Stafford*	2
Durham	1	Middlefield*	2	Tolland	4
East Granby*	1	Montville*	1	Washington*	1
East Haddam*	1	New Fairfield*	7	Westbrook*	3
East Lyme*	1	New Hartford*	1	Woodbury*	2

\*Towns with a police officer or constables supervised by CSP

\*\* Bridgewater and Roxbury have entered into an agreement to share a resident state trooper

**Table 1. 3: Towns that Employ Constables by Troop**

Town Name	Number of Constables	Town Name	Number of Constables
Troop A		Troop F cont.	
Bridgewater	6	Essex	6
New Fairfield	8	Old Lyme	8
Oxford	15	Westbrook	11
Redding	1	Troop H	
Roxbury	4	East Granby	7
Southbury	23	Troop I	
Troop B		Beacon Falls	14
Barkhamsted	1	Bethany	5
New Hartford	5	Prospect	19
Salisbury	3	Troop K	
Troop C		Colchester	11
Ellington	16	East Haddam	9
Somers	8	Hebron	3
Stafford	10	Lebanon	5
Troop D		Marlborough	4
Hampton	1	Troop L	
Killingly	2	Bethlehem	9
Troop E		Burlington	11
Montville	25	Litchfield	2
Troop F		Washington	3
Chester	4	Woodbury	17
Deep River	2		

**I.B: TRAFFIC STOP DATA COLLECTION SYSTEM**

Police have significant discretion in terms of when they make a traffic stop, the type of stop they make, and in determining the outcome of the stop. There are hundreds of traffic violations outlined in statute and the public relies on law enforcement to use their judgment to determine the most appropriate use of their time and effort. Upon stopping a vehicle, it is common for police to gather

the driver's license, vehicle registration, and insurance information. The officer will then verify through a statewide system that the information is up to date, and there are no outstanding warrants related to the driver or passengers in the vehicle. At that time, the officer must determine whether to take no action or issue a verbal warning, written warning, infraction, misdemeanor summons, or make an arrest. Regardless of the stop outcome, police are required to complete a racial profiling form, in compliance with the Alvin W. Penn Racial Profiling Law (CGS 54-1m).

The law states that traffic stop information must be recorded for all stops that meet the definition of a traffic stop unless the police officer was required to leave the location of the stop in order to respond to an emergency or due to some other exigent circumstances within the scope of such police officer's duties. For this purpose, a traffic stop is defined in the following way:

"Any time an officer initiates contact with a vehicle resulting in the detention of an individual and/or vehicle. Stops made as part of a checkpoint or spot check enforcement are considered officer initiated if contact with the operator is extended for any purpose. A traffic stop does not include contacts providing assistance to a motorist, all contacts arising from traffic crashes, or in cases where an officer initiates contact with a vehicle that has been linked to a specific incident, whether based on a motor vehicle or a criminal complaint."

The following is a list of information that must be reported to the state for all stops that meet the definition of a traffic stop:

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| 1. Date of stop   | 10. Disposition of the Stop                  |
| 2. Time of stop   | 11. Connecticut Resident                     |
| 3. Geographic Location  | 12. Resident of Municipality making the stop |
| 4. Unique Officer ID number   | 13. Was a search conducted                   |
| 5. Officer perception of driver race, color, ethnicity, age, and gender         | 14. Authority for Search                     |
| 6. Nature of alleged traffic or other violation that caused the stop to be made | 15. Search Disposition                       |
| 7. Enforcement Type   | 16. Custodial Arrest Made                    |
| 8. Statutory citation for a stop  | 17. Duration of Stop                         |
| 9. If different, the statutory citation resulting from the stop                 | 18. Was the vehicle towed                    |

In order to submit the information required under the Alvin W. Penn law, CSP personnel rely on their records management system (RMS). CSP contracts with a records management system vendor called NexGen. Sworn CSP personnel have access to the RMS system through a computer terminal in their police cruiser. The RMS system allows CSP personnel to report information on all activity including traffic stops, calls for service, arrests, and other public interactions. When a Trooper or Constable reports that they made a traffic stop within the RMS system, the system will prompt them to complete the required racial profiling information. The stop cannot be cleared from the system until the required information has been submitted.

Our audit found that there is a key difference between the standard operating procedures of the CSP and many municipal police departments in that CSP personnel can create their own traffic stop number. CSP personnel can directly report to the RMS system that they made a traffic stop, without directly engaging with a dispatcher which provides the trooper with a case number and prompts the completion of racial profiling information. On the other hand, many municipal police departments

require their officers to communicate with a dispatcher prior to a traffic stop or case number being issued. For those departments, the dispatcher controls the issuance of a case number, which would prompt the required racial profiling information to be completed. Dispatchers also retain detailed information about the stop in their “dispatch log.”

Although racial profiling information must be reported regardless of the stop disposition, stops that result in no action or a verbal warning do not have a paper document provided to the driver. A physical paper document is provided to the driver when the stop results in a written warning, infraction, or misdemeanor summons. Copies of written warnings may be retained by the police agency, whereas infractions and misdemeanor summons are submitted to the Judicial branch for adjudication.

### **I.C: BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CT'S CITATION SYSTEM**

Mail-in violations and infractions are uniform across the State of Connecticut. These violations are all processed by a centralized department, known as the Centralized Infractions Bureau (CIB). For more than a decade, Connecticut has been migrating from a manual, paper-based citation system to an electronic one. The electronic citation (e-citation) system allows for pertinent data to be transmitted electronically to CIB. There are many advantages to using the e-citation system, including that it saves police officers time in processing an infraction. Additionally, most RMS vendors designed the system to automatically input fields on an infraction that overlap with the information required to be reported to the racial profiling system.

The paper citation system is more cumbersome and time-consuming for both CIB and officers. Officers are provided with an infraction book where each citation has a printed number, and the book includes a series of sequential citation numbers. The book has carbon copy paper that allows an officer to complete the required infraction information. One copy of the infraction is provided to the driver, one is mailed to CIB, and one is retained by the department. Unlike an electronic infraction which automatically populates most of the racial profiling information, if an officer issues a paper infraction, they must then enter all the required racial profiling information into the RMS system. For most municipal police departments, the officer would have already communicated with a dispatcher regarding the stop and the racial profiling form would be prompted by the dispatcher. However, CSP personnel must initiate the reporting of racial profiling information on their own.

The RMS used by state police has allowed the use of the e-citation system for many years. In addition to having the software to process an e-citation, officers must also have hardware that allows them to print a copy of the infraction that will be provided to the driver. Additionally, a significant amount of data captured on the infraction is automatically added to the racial profiling tab within the RMS system. The officer can override the information that is populated in the racial profiling system from the e-citation. However, there are very few scenarios that would warrant changes to be made.

A relatively small number of manually written infractions are done by state police personnel. Usually, this occurs when an officer makes a stop and is using a vehicle that is not equipped with e-citation equipment, or as a backup if the e-citation is down or temporarily unavailable.

## II. TIMELINE OF EVENTS

The following is a timeline of events and activities that have transpired since the initial reporting of the 2018 State Police internal investigation of falsified traffic stop records.

**August 25, 2022:** Hearst Connecticut Media published an article, *“4 Troopers fabricate hundreds of tickets to gain favor, perks. They avoided serious consequences.”*<sup>5</sup>

The article alleged that in 2018 four state police troopers assigned to Troop E in Montville had fabricated traffic stop citation records. The article further stated that CSP conducted an internal investigation, which sustained the allegations. It was reported that these troopers were creating “ghost stops,” to boost their apparent productivity. Troopers are evaluated quarterly by supervisors based in part on their activity while on duty. While Connecticut law prohibits quotas for traffic stops and tickets, there are no directives that limit the extent to which officer activity can be used to evaluate job performance. The article reported that positive performance evaluations resulted in benefits for troopers including a preference for shift assignments, new or special police vehicles, promotions, and overtime assignments. It further stated that the internal investigations substantiated the allegations against the four troopers. Two of the troopers received suspension and two retired before any disciplinary action was taken.

**August 26, 2022:** Chairman William R. Dyson contacts CSP Colonel Stavros Mellekas

Following the publication of the article, the Connecticut Racial Profiling Prohibition Project advisory board was immediately concerned that fabricated infraction records may have resulted in fabricated records being submitted to Connecticut’s racial profiling data collection system. Chairman William R. Dyson contacted Colonel Stavros Mellekas of the Connecticut State Police to express the advisory board’s deep concern about the recent reporting and our desire to determine if any racial profiling records were fabricated by these troopers.

Since 2015, the Connecticut Racial Profiling Prohibition Project (CTRP3) advisory board has been responsible for conducting an annual analysis of all traffic stop records in Connecticut. The annual analysis not only reviews aggregate data for the entire state but also reviews data for each municipal police department, state police troop barracks, and special police agencies such as university police, the State Capitol Police, and the Department of Motor Vehicles. We were concerned that a significant level of intentional fabrication of traffic stop records could have an impact on the previous racial profiling analyses conducted for the state police and individual troop barracks. During the time of the alleged scheme to fabricate infraction records by these four troopers, researchers also conducted a comprehensive five-year study for the state police, which was published in May 2020.

Chairman Dyson further expressed concerns that the CTRP3 advisory board was never notified by the CSP of the potentially falsified records. A timely notification could have helped researchers ensure that due diligence was done regarding the quality of data being analyzed by researchers. The

---

<sup>5</sup>[https://www.ctpost.com/news/article/CT-state-troopers-created-fake-tickets-17393441.php?utm\\_campaign=CMS%20Sharing%20Tools%20\(Premium\)&utm\\_source=share-by-email&utm\\_medium=email](https://www.ctpost.com/news/article/CT-state-troopers-created-fake-tickets-17393441.php?utm_campaign=CMS%20Sharing%20Tools%20(Premium)&utm_source=share-by-email&utm_medium=email)

Chairman, with support from the advisory board, directed the project staff to determine if the four troopers accused of fabricating infraction records submitted falsified racial profiling records.

**September 6, 2022:** CSP provides redacted IA reports to Project Staff

The project staff received redacted copies of the internal affairs investigation reports completed by CSP<sup>6</sup>. Upon review of the reports, it was clear that investigators were also concerned about the fabrication of the racial profiling data, although the primary focus of the investigations appeared to be the extent to which the four troopers falsified their traffic stop activities in order to appear more “productive” to supervisors than they actually were. It doesn’t appear that investigators charged any of the troopers directly with falsifying racial profiling records and no criminal charges were brought. However, investigators highlighted a violation of C.G.S. 53a-139<sup>7</sup>, Forgery in the second degree. All four troopers were found in violation of the following CSP administrative policies:

- *Commission of an intentional act of deception during any criminal, civil, or administrative investigation, or proceeding, or on an official department form, report, or system including (a) lying by either omission or commission; and (b) misleading; (c) civil or criminal fraud; and/or (d) perjury.*
- *Utilization of the employee’s position as a member of the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection for their own benefit or for some purpose other than in furtherance of the mission of the agency, e.g., “fixing” or attempting to “fix” a ticket, a serious violation of the State Ethics Code, utilization of department information or equipment for personal gain, cheating on competitive examinations for promotion or selection to a specialized unit.*
- *Misuse of state equipment, e.g., vehicle, computer, phone, credit card.*

According to the IA reports, one trooper received a 10-day suspension, and one received a two-day suspension. Two of the Troopers retired prior to the completion of the investigation. It is worth noting as part of Public Act 20-1, *An Act Concerning Police Accountability*, the legislature expanded the reasons for revocations of a police officer’s certification to include falsifying reports or a violation of the Alvin W. Penn Racial Profiling Prohibition Act<sup>8</sup>. Prior to these reforms, a police officer’s certification could only be revoked if the officer was convicted of a felony or if the officer falsified a document to obtain or renew the certification. Until 2020, State Police were exempt from the requirement that police officers be certified by the Police Officer Standards and Training Council (POSTC).

The IA reports referred to an internal audit of all Troopers that was conducted by the CSP in 2018. The project staff requested a copy of the audit to better understand how CSP assessed the size and scope of this issue.

**September 8, 2022:** Project staff met with CSP personnel and representatives from the NexGen records management system company.

The project staff met with personnel from the CSP and their records management system company to gather information and assess how records are collected and reported by troopers.

---

<sup>6</sup> A summary by the project staff of the CSP internal affairs investigations can be found in Appendix A.

<sup>7</sup> C.G.S. 53a-139 is a Class D felony.

<sup>8</sup> A violation of the Alvin W. Penn Act is to be considered as part of subsection (g) if an officer engages in conduct that undermines public confidence in law enforcement.



**September 13, 2022:** Project staff received a copy of the internal agency-wide audit CSP conducted to review the infraction records reported by all troopers between January 1, 2018, and September 1, 2018. The internal audit was launched in October 2018.

The audit revealed that “there were disparities between the CAD Infraction Count compared to the total number of e-ticket infractions issued” (Agency Generated Complaint, page 1). The audit covered the infractions issued electronically through the e-ticket system during the eight-month period but none of the handwritten infractions issued by CSP personnel. CSP stated that they were trying to determine if there was a system and/or training issue or misuse of the system.

At the time, CSP decided to focus its analysis on those personnel showing fifty (50) or more discrepancies<sup>9</sup> between the internal CSP system and the e-ticket infractions submitted to the Centralized Infractions Bureau. Based on this parameter, the audit revealed a total of seventeen (17) troopers with discrepancies meeting its threshold. Although CSP did not include handwritten infractions in their initial agency-wide audit, they decided to review any handwritten infractions submitted by the 17 selected troopers. They determined that five of the 17 Troopers did not have a discrepancy after accounting for handwritten infractions.

This left 12 Troopers<sup>10</sup> with discrepancies meeting the selection criterion of 50 or more discrepancies they had chosen. Only one of the four troopers from Troop E that were the subjects of the IA investigations CSP had conducted was identified in the internal audit. Therefore, of the 12 Troopers determined by CSPs own internal audit to have significant discrepancies, 11 of them were newly identified. The audit and CSP have provided no evidence that internal affairs investigations were opened into these 11 Troopers or how the issue was ultimately resolved.

We concluded that the audit conducted by CSP was incomplete and included arbitrary thresholds for determining the significance of a discrepancy. A threshold of 50 discrepancies in an eight-month time period is large, but it also lacked context for the overall volume of infractions issued by the Trooper. For example, a discrepancy of 50 out of 60 infractions (83% discrepancy rate) should be considered differently when compared to a discrepancy of 50 out of 500 infractions (10% discrepancy rate). Additionally, CSP should have attempted to include handwritten infractions in the audit to gain a fuller picture of the potential falsification of records. Although the audit was incomplete, it provided information that falsified records may be more widespread than just the four Troopers investigated from Troop E.

**September 6, 2022 to September 21, 2022:** Project staff conducted an expanded audit of all infractions reported by the four troopers from Troop E investigated for falsifying records covering the entire period from 2014 through 2021 during which they were required to submit data to the racial profiling database pursuant to the Alvin Penn Act.

After reviewing the four individual IA reports and internal agency-wide CSP audit, the project staff reviewed the data submitted to the racial profiling database by the four investigated troopers from Troop E. The IA investigations did not make it clear whether the records the troopers had falsified existed solely within internal CSP records or were also submitted to the state pursuant to the Alvin W. Penn racial profiling law. Our evaluation determined that questionable records from all four troopers had, in fact, been submitted to the racial profiling data reporting program. In total, more

---

<sup>9</sup> If the threshold was 10 or more discrepancies, there would have been 132 Troopers identified.

<sup>10</sup> The 12 Troopers were assigned to Troop A, C, E, F, I, K, L, and the Traffic Unit

than 1,300 racial profiling records were fabricated by these four troopers between 2014 and 2018<sup>11</sup>. A brief summary of our evaluation of the records submitted by each trooper is highlighted below:

Trooper Daniel Richter had a small discrepancy (11 infractions) in 2015. Starting in 2016, more than half of Trooper Richter's infractions (68 infractions) were unaccounted for in the CIB data system and are presumed to have been falsified. Interestingly, Trooper Richter did not submit any infraction records between January 2016 and July 2016. Falsified records largely start to be submitted in August 2016 onward. In 2017, there were at least 154 falsified infractions (40% of reported infraction activity), and 140 falsified infractions (30% of activity) in 2018. Trooper Richter appeared to stop submitting falsified infractions in September 2018, around the time of an internal affairs investigation being opened into his activity. The records submitted between October 2018 and January 2021, largely appear to be accurate. There were at least 369 falsified records submitted between August 2016 and September 2018, which account for almost 40% of Trooper Richter's reported activity.

Trooper Timothy Bentley had no significant discrepancies until October 2015. Over 50% of the infractions reported during the last quarter of 2015 were falsified (80 infractions). The discrepancies continued each month during the 2016 calendar year, although the overall volume of traffic infractions decreased. In 2016, there were at least 104 falsified infractions (42% of activity), 183 falsified infractions (83% of activity) in 2017, and 69 falsified infractions (88% of activity) in 2018. Trooper Bentley stopped submitting infraction records in September 2018, around the time of an internal affairs investigation being opened into his activity. There were at least 436 falsified records submitted between October 2015 and September 2018, which account for almost 62% of Trooper Bentley's reported activity.

Trooper Noah Gouveia had discrepancies from the beginning of our audit period, which was January 2014<sup>12</sup>. Although discrepancies existed beginning in January 2014, the discrepancies grew in subsequent years. There were at least 56 falsified infractions (10% of activity) in 2014, 145 falsified infractions (28% of activity) in 2015, 111 falsified infractions (53% of activity) in 2016, 180 falsified records (52% of activity) in 2017, and 85 falsified infractions (46% of activity) in 2018. Trooper Gouveia stopped submitting infraction records in September 2018, around the time of an internal affairs investigation being opened into his activity. There were at least 577 falsified records submitted between January 2014 and September 2018, which account for almost 32% of Trooper Gouveia's reported activity.

Trooper Kevin Moore's activity was different from the other three Troopers. At first glance, it would not appear that Trooper Moore falsified any infraction records. However, IA investigators determined that Trooper Moore was changing the disposition of actions related to traffic crashes and reporting them as traffic stops. In particular, Trooper Moore was accused of reporting infractions issued during a traffic crash investigation as infractions issued during a traffic stop. When a Trooper codes an infraction as part of a traffic stop, the system automatically requires the Trooper to complete the racial profiling records. We confirmed that infractions issued during a traffic crash, which should not prompt racial

---

<sup>11</sup> Project staff was only able to assess records that resulted in an infraction. We were unable to determine if stops that resulted in a warning, misdemeanor summons, or no disposition were fabricated.

<sup>12</sup> Although reforms to the Alvin W. Penn law went into effect on October 1, 2013, we decided to begin our audit in January 2014 to more easily assess calendar year differences.

profiling records to be completed, were falsely submitted to the racial profiling system as traffic stops. Between January 2014 and February 2019, Trooper Moore only reported a total of 165 infractions to the racial profiling system. It was challenging to determine exactly how many of those records were misrepresented as traffic stops but the relatively small total number of stops reported over these five years in all likelihood meant that it did not impact the overall records in the same manner as the other troopers.

**September 22, 2022, to October 19, 2022:** Project staff audits infractions submitted by all troopers assigned to Troop E in 2018.

Once the project staff determined that the four Troopers investigated by CSP submitted falsified records to the state racial profiling system, CSP leadership recommended that we audit the other Troopers assigned to Troop E during the 2018 calendar year. Since all four Troopers were assigned to Troop E when the falsified records were discovered, it seemed reasonable to begin any further review with this Troop. Although we had reviewed the CSP internal audit, which indicated the possibility of a more widespread problem, we believed it was prudent to determine if the issue might be more isolated to the barracks where these four Troopers were assigned.

We reviewed activity for 79 troopers assigned to Troop E in 2018, not including constables. There was a total of 38 troopers with at least one discrepancy in their records. Of these, 13 had more than 10 discrepancies. The three Troopers with the most significant discrepancies were Trooper Richter, Trooper Gouveia, and Trooper Bentley, all of whom were investigated by internal affairs. However, we determined that at least six others had large enough discrepancies that, in our opinion, could have warranted further review by CSP at the time.

The completion of the Troop E 2018 audit, the audit of the four Troopers investigated for falsifying infractions, and the review of the CSP internal audit led the project staff to conclude that this issue was not isolated to the four Troopers investigated by CSP. We recommended to the CTRP3 advisory board that a comprehensive audit be conducted to determine the size and scope of the problem. In addition, we determined that a more comprehensive review was required to determine if the introduction of falsified records into the racial profiling database might have compromised findings from any of our previous analyses.

**October 20, 2022:** CTRP3 advisory board meets to discuss initial findings of project staff.

The project staff presented to the CTRP3 advisory board the findings of the initial reviews conducted for the four troopers initially investigated by CSP as well as the limited audit of 2018 Troop E records. The board requested the project staff to work with the newly formed Data Collection, Analysis, and Quality Subcommittee to develop a proposal for a comprehensive audit of state police records.

**November 10, 2022:** CTRP3 Data Collection, Analysis, and Quality subcommittee meets to discuss a plan for a comprehensive audit of CSP records submitted to the racial profiling reporting system since its inception.

The subcommittee met to discuss how to proceed with the comprehensive audit and, based on feedback from CSP representatives, it agreed to recommend to the full advisory board that a full audit be conducted of the Eastern District. Based on the findings from the audit, the advisory board could determine whether to expand the audit to the Central and Western Districts as well.

**November 17, 2022:** CTRP3 Advisory Board meeting to discuss a plan to conduct a comprehensive audit of CSP records.

The Data Collection, Analysis, and Quality subcommittee presented their recommendation that an audit be conducted for the Eastern District. Based on the findings from that audit, the advisory board could determine whether it was appropriate to expand to the Central and Western Districts. The advisory board determined that an audit limited only to the Eastern District was not sufficient. The board unanimously supported a motion for the project staff to conduct a comprehensive audit of the Connecticut State Police infraction records submitted to the racial profiling system between January 1, 2014, and December 31, 2021.

**November 22, 2022:** CSP provides the project staff with the requested information.

The CSP provided all information requested by the project staff that would be needed to conduct a comprehensive audit of traffic stop infraction records. The results of the audit are provided in the subsequent sections of this report.

### **III. SUMMARY OF THE AUDIT METHODOLOGY**

The Connecticut Racial Profiling Prohibition Project (CTRP3) advisory board tasked the project staff at the Institute for Municipal and Regional Policy (IMRP) at UConn to develop a method for auditing traffic citations reported to the racial profiling database by the Connecticut State Police between January 1, 2014, and December 31, 2021. The advisory board believed there was ample evidence that the four troopers investigated by CSP falsified more than 1,300 racial profiling records. The board also believed that the results from the limited audit conducted of troopers assigned to Troop E in 2018 and the discrepancies identified in the internal audit conducted by CSP provided additional evidence of a more widespread problem.

Our audit focused on stops that were reported to have resulted in an infraction. Infractions that are reported to the racial profiling system should have a corresponding record in the state's Centralized Infractions Bureau (CIB) system, which is maintained by the Judicial Branch. In other words, if an officer stops a car and issues an infraction both the racial profiling database and the Judicial database should have a record of the stop. The expectation is that a properly entered traffic stop record in the racial profiling database should have a corresponding record in the independently maintained CIB database.

The CSP Internal Affairs investigation of the four troopers in 2018 identified significant discrepancies between the number of infractions they reported to the CSP's record management system and the number of infraction records submitted to CIB. In effect, the independent CIB database served as a "real world" check against the CSP's internal record. In the case of our expanded audit, the principle was the same except that the CIB database served as a check against the racial profiling database instead of the CSP records management system. While the two databases are maintained separately, the data in the racial profiling database essentially comes from the CSP record system. The approach was essentially the same as used by the internal investigation and the CSP agency-wide audit but different in scope of analysis and what constituted outliers in the audit results.

Although in a perfect situation, it would have been preferable to audit all reported stops, regardless of the disposition, it was neither practical nor possible to do so. While stops with adjudicated outcomes (infractions, misdemeanors, etc.) can be independently verified through judicial records, those that result in a written or verbal warning are much harder to verify because warnings, particularly verbal warnings, are not recorded anywhere outside of the racial profiling system. Therefore, it was only possible to audit the infractions in a comprehensive way. While this limitation was not a significant impediment to the audit because, for most of the audit period infractions constituted more than two-thirds of all stops made by troopers and constables, infraction outcomes have been declining precipitously since 2019 and now represent less than 50% of all stops made by troopers and constables.

Based on the sensitive nature of the accusations that the audit was investigating, the project staff determined that it would be advisable to conduct two separate audits of the same databases using slightly different principles. The IMRP at UConn and researchers from Northeastern University conducted separate audits. The different methods used to conduct each audit allowed them to achieve different, but complementary, objectives in presenting the relevant information. The IMRP audit provided a more general overview of the nature of the data discrepancies while the statistically

more rigorous analytical methods employed by the Northeastern University analysts provides additional context for interpreting how the performance of individual personnel varied from agency and troop norms. Conducting two independent audits allowed for each to serve as a robustness check for the other. It will also increase the validity of findings stemming from the analysis of the traffic stop data if multiple methods yield similar conclusions.

### **Accessing and Cleaning Datasets**

In order to conduct the audit, the project staff requested that the CIB provide a database with all infractions issued by a Trooper or Constable between January 1, 2014, and December 31, 2021. Although the staff maintains an official dataset by year of stops reported to the racial profiling database, we re-downloaded the records from the Criminal Justice Information System to ensure the most accurate records were being used for the audit<sup>13</sup>. The records were examined to identify and remove any duplicated cases that may have been incorrectly submitted to the databases<sup>14</sup>.

CIB provided the project staff with eight data points for every infraction issued by the state police or towns with constables under state police jurisdiction. The data provided included:

- Troop/Unit
- Office Shield Number
- Ticket Number
- Charge Category
- Issue Date
- First Charge Listed
- Court Docket Number
- Calendar Year

As part of a multi-year memorandum of understanding, CIB also annually provides the project staff with a dataset of all infractions that included 23 data points. We retained the complete infraction records provided as part of the MOU and compared those records to the more limited data provided for the audit. The more detailed infraction data includes all of the data elements listed above plus additional demographic information reported on each infraction. Additionally, the more detailed data includes all violations listed on an infraction citation, not just the first charge. Both datasets were compared for accuracy and were used in the audit for different purposes.

### **Matching Records Between Databases**

Infractions submitted to the CIB are assigned a ticket number. This is a unique number that allows the state judicial system to track and adjudicate offenses. However, CSP tracks all traffic stops using a case number. The case number and ticket number are different. The case number is not captured

---

<sup>13</sup> Occasionally, police agencies will submit traffic stop records to the racial profiling database after data is downloaded for analysis.

<sup>14</sup> In 2018, the project staff discovered that a large number of duplicate case records were included in the CSP data. Although the case number was the same, the records had at least one difference. It was not uncommon for some troopers to submit more than one record per stop, which inflated the total number of stops reported. The duplicate records were typically the result of multiple violations being cited in a single stop. Between January 1, 2014, and December 31, 2021, we identified more than 52,000 duplicate case numbers, 76% of which were reported by Troop A, Troop D, and Troop K. A technical change was made to the system which largely addressed this issue by late 2018.

in the CIB system and the ticket number is only captured in the CSP system when an electronic ticket is issued. CSP provided us with the case number and matching ticket number for the 699,176 e-tickets issued during the audit period. There were 141,320 infractions that were not issued through the e-ticket system and could not be matched by case number and a ticket number.

Troopers and Constables are assigned a unique identifying number by the records management system utilized by CSP. This number is assigned at the time of hire and does not change during the entirety of their employment. For the purposes of this report, we will refer to this number as the employee's "NexGen ID."

In addition to being assigned a unique NexGen ID, Troopers and Constables are assigned a badge number. Upon leaving the agency, the badge number is recycled. High-ranking personnel from Colonel to Master Sergeant are assigned a badge number less than 100. Sergeants are assigned a badge number between 100 and 299. Troopers and Trooper First Class are assigned badge numbers higher than 300 and in no specific order. Constables are assigned badge numbers that begin with the Troop barracks identification letter where the town jurisdiction is located, followed by the letter C to denote Constable, and then a number less than 100. For example, a Constable working in Montville, which is within the boundaries of Troop E, would have a badge number of EC01.

The NexGen ID rather than the badge number is provided for all stops reported to the racial profiling database because it never changes for an individual whereas a badge number could change or be reused over time. However, the badge number is provided on all infractions submitted to CIB. For the 141,320 infractions that could not be linked by case number and ticket number, we can link the record by determining the badge number that corresponds with the NexGen ID during each calendar year. A trooper's badge number can change during a calendar year if they are promoted. In those cases, we were able to track when the change occurred and link to the datasets accordingly. We also could determine if the badge number of a former employee had been reused for a new employee.

We discovered that a significant number of Constables would frequently drop the first two letters of their badge number when completing an infraction record. This would make it appear that the stop was made by a Trooper with the same number. For example, the Constable with the badge number EC04 might report their badge number on a ticket as 04. There is a high-ranking police commander with badge number 04. To address this shortcoming in the data, we decided to link the infraction to a Constable when the location of the infraction was listed within the boundaries of the town where the Constable patrolled and if there was a matching badge number. Since this issue only impacted CSP personnel with a badge number less than 100, we decided to exclude them from the analysis. CSP personnel with a low badge number are usually assigned administrative duties with their primary responsibility being supervisory and they were unlikely to make many traffic stops during the normal course of duty.

### **Brief Summary of Statistical Analysis Methodology**

We use the linked data to conduct two key analyses for troopers<sup>15</sup>:

1. a comparison of the demographics and temporal characteristics of matched vs. unmatched records in the racial profiling and judiciary databases.

---

<sup>15</sup> Researchers were limited in their ability to evaluate constables. A different process was used for constables and is outlined in Chapter V.

2. a comparison of officers who are outliers in any given year in terms of their overall volume of unmatched records in the racial profiling and judiciary databases.

We first linked 699,176 records directly between the racial profiling and judiciary databases based on a crosswalk<sup>16</sup> provided to us by CSP. Unfortunately, this crosswalk was only available for electronic tickets and did not contain any information for a large number of handwritten tickets. To link the handwritten tickets between both datasets, we leverage several common attributes which are recorded in both the CIB and racial profiling systems. These attributes include:

- a. Trooper identification number
- b. Date
- c. Location
- d. Violation code
- e. Motorist sex
- f. Motorist age
- g. Motorist state of residence

For the unmatched records in both databases, we proceed by linking non-electronic tickets using a sequential matching procedure. First, we match on the trooper's unique identification number as well as the date +/- 2 days and the motorist's age +/- 2 years. We then sort the potential matches by the intervention date and time listed in the racial profiling database. Beginning with the earliest racial profiling record for a given officer that satisfies these criteria, we make matches to the CIB database based on the *best* corresponding record. We define the "best" corresponding record based on ranking each potential match from 0 = highest rank (no errors found) to 12 = lowest rank (only errors found). The ranking system is based on the number of errors found across six variables that are common to both databases. These variables include motorist age, state of residence, and sex as well as stop date, location, and violation code.<sup>17</sup> A potential match with a rank of 0 would indicate that all six variables in the CIB and racial profiling database are exactly the same while a rank of 12 would indicate that none of these six variables are the same. At an absolute minimum, all we require for a match is that the same trooper identifier is listed in both databases, the dates are within two days of each other, and that the motorist's age is recorded within 2 years of each other<sup>18</sup> or missing in one or both records.

After running this procedure on the set of infractions in the racial profiling database, we rerun the procedure a second time on the sample of unmatched records but relax the condition that the trooper identification must match. In particular, we allow for matches to any trooper identification number

---

<sup>16</sup> A crosswalk is a data translation tool that allowed researchers to match individual records in the racial profiling and CIB databases.


<sup>17</sup> We order the ranking based on the size of the conditional error rate from the e-ticket crosswalk such that  $p(\text{age error} \mid \text{different error}) = 10.97\%$ ,  $p(\text{CT resident error} \mid \text{different error}) = 4.03\%$ ,  $p(\text{sex error} \mid \text{different error}) = 3.64\%$ ,  $p(\text{date error} \mid \text{different error}) = 0.98\%$ ,  $p(\text{location error} \mid \text{different error}) = 0.50\%$ . Conditional on meeting the criteria that age is +/- 2 years (or null) and date +/- 2 days, we order the ranking between 0 to 14 based on the number of errors. The ranking (0) exact match on all criteria; (1) exact match on all but age; (2) exact match on all but residence; (3) exact match on all but sex; (4) exact match on all but date; (5) exact match on all but location; (6) exact match on all but violation code; (7) exact match on any five variables; (8) exact match on any four variables; (9) exact match on any three variables; (10) exact match on any two variables; (11) exact match on any one variables; (12) no exact match on any variable.

<sup>18</sup> If the age in either the racial profiling database or the CIB database was null, then the match on age was not required.



listed on a given ticket book (consisting of ten tickets) which allows for possible transcription errors on any given ticket. Finally, we run the procedure a third time where we allow for warnings in the racial profiling database to match unmatched infractions in the CIB database. Figure 3.1 provides a flow chart that describes the matching process that we apply by sequentially crawling through the racial profiling database. Note that we made accommodations for infractions issued as the result of a crash or for a violation clearly not likely to be the nexus for making a traffic stop.

**Figure 3. 1: Outline of Matching Process**



As a robustness check on the statistical analysis, we also conducted a simpler descriptive analysis. In this method, once the records were matched between the racial profiling and CIB systems, we simply counted the total number of infractions reported to the racial profiling system and the total number of infractions reported to the CIB system<sup>19</sup> each year. There should never be more infractions reported by an officer to the racial profiling system than infractions reported to the CIB system. However, there can be more infractions in the CIB system for an officer because infractions can be issued for violations that are not related to a traffic stop. Racial profiling records are only required when a traffic stop is conducted. For example, an officer may issue an infraction as part of a crash investigation or to an individual who is observed to be jaywalking. In those cases, CIB would have a record of the infraction, but it is not related to a traffic stop. Infractions issued as a result of a traffic crash or that were not related to a traffic violation were removed from the analysis<sup>20</sup>.

---

<sup>19</sup> Infractions in the CIB system are coded as MI for moving infraction or CI for a criminal infraction.


<sup>20</sup> In 2015, Connecticut launched a comprehensive system for collecting data on traffic crashes. Data from all crashes is available on the Connecticut Traffic Crash Data Repository. Officers report if they issued an infraction as the result of a crash investigation. We were able to determine the officer that issued the infraction because the information is linked to the officer's badge number. This allowed us to remove those infractions from the total number of infractions issued by a Trooper in a given year. Infractions can also be written for violations that are clearly not related to a motor vehicle stop. Our researchers went through the Superior Court Infractions booklet and identified all the statutes that are for violations that could not be related to a traffic stop. Once identified, we removed those infractions from the total number of infractions written by a trooper.

## IV. AUDIT FINDINGS (TROOPERS)

Our audit identified two issues related to the reporting of racial profiling records by CSP – (i) overreported records; and (ii) underreported records. As we will discuss in the below sections of the report, there are troopers with discrepancies between the racial profiling database and the CIB database where more records were reported to the racial profiling database. Based on our analysis, we believe that at least some of the traffic stop records in the racial profiling database were falsely reported. Additionally, we found that there were discrepancies where there were significantly more records in the CIB database, after accounting for infractions issued during a crash investigation and for non-traffic related violations, compared to the racial profiling system. In this case, we believe it is likely that these records were underreported to the racial profiling system, in violation of the reporting requirements of the Alvin W. Penn Act. In order to fully explain the difference between the issue of overreported records and underreported records in the racial profiling database, we present our findings separately.

In the racial profiling database, there were a total of 1,143,879 unique traffic stops made by Connecticut State Police from 2014 to 2021<sup>21</sup>. Of these unique traffic stops, 804,063 (70.3%) were recorded as resulting in an infraction. According to records provided by the Centralized Infractions Bureau (CIB), there were a total of 946,056 infractions<sup>22</sup> recorded by the Connecticut State Police over the same period. Traffic enforcement declined by 68% between 2014 and 2021 for CSP. Prior to the pandemic, which appears to have dramatically reduced traffic enforcement, traffic enforcement declined 32% between 2014 and 2019. Infractions also significantly decreased, both in numbers and as a total share of stop outcomes. Infractions issued by CSP declined by almost 80% between 2014 and 2021. Infractions had already declined by 34% prior to the pandemic. In 2021, warnings exceeded infractions for the first time. Figure 4.1 shows the total number of stops by disposition reported to have been made by CSP during the audit period.

**Figure 4. 1: Total Number of Stops by Disposition**




<sup>21</sup> Note that this number excludes stops made by constables and troopers with a badge number less than one hundred.

<sup>22</sup> This total includes all infractions submitted to CIB including infractions relating to a crash or non-traffic related violations.

Researchers reviewed data submitted by 1,301 Troopers<sup>23</sup>. Troopers needed to submit at least one infraction to the racial profiling database in order to be evaluated in our analysis. CSP averaged 761 troopers submitting records in a given year. The total number of troopers submitting records each calendar year declined by 22% between 2014 and 2021. Figure 4.2 shows the total number of troopers that reported racial profiling records each year.

**Figure 4. 2: Number of Troopers submitting records to RP System**




#### **IV.A. AUDIT OF OVERREPORTED AND INACCURATE RACIAL PROFILING RECORDS**

The Connecticut State Police provided a crosswalk linking records between the racial profiling and CIB databases but only for the 699,005 (87.5% and 76.0% of the racial profiling and CIB infractions, respectively) electronic tickets issued. For the remaining unmatched records in both databases, we proceed by linking non-electronic tickets using a sequential matching procedure outlined in Chapter 3. Using the matching criteria, we link an additional 79,092 records from the racial profiling database to the CIB database. Of these 79,092 matched records, only 22,674 contained a complete match of the demographics between the CIB and racial profiling records while 23,831 had one error, and 17,908 had two or more errors.<sup>24</sup> There were 14,679 records matched when we allow for matches to any trooper identification number listed on a given ticket book which allows for possible transcription errors on any given ticket. Figure 4.3 plots the number of matched records based on the matching criteria.

<sup>23</sup> For the purposes of this report, the term Trooper refers to sworn personnel employed by the Connecticut State Police and does not distinguish between ranks.


<sup>24</sup> Note that even in the case of matched records with six demographic errors, we still require a match on the trooper's unique identifier as well as the age in both datasets to be +/-2 years (or blank) and the date to be +/-2 days. Put simply, we allow for an extremely loose criteria for matching records between the two datasets.

**Figure 4. 3: Characteristics of Matched and Unmatched Records**




It is unclear whether the records with multiple errors are false records or inaccurate reporting of data. There are 17,908 records with multiple errors and in many cases almost the entire record, except for badge number and date +/- 2 days, did not match. CSP records contained proportionately greater errors between 2014 and 2015 compared to later years. There were seven troops that exceeded the average for records with multiple errors including troops A, C, D, E, F, I, and L. Of the racial profiling records with multiple errors, it is possible that at least some of these records are false. Figure 4.4 shows the ratio of records with multiple errors by year and Figure 4.5 shows the ratio of records with multiple errors by Troop.

**Figure 4. 4: Racial Profiling Records with Multiple Errors by Year (Ratio)**




**Figure 4. 5: Racial Profiling Records with Multiple Errors by Troop (Ratio)**



For the remainder of this section, we are going to focus on the records that were unmatched. In the racial profiling database, we are left with 25,966 traffic stops listed as having resulted in an infraction but where we are unable to link to any records in the CIB database. Based on our criteria, the range of overreported racial profiling records can be as large as 58,553 and as small as 25,966. Based on the methodology used to determine traffic stop matches across databases, there is a high likelihood that at least 25,966 traffic stop records in the racial profiling database are false. We allowed for extremely loose matching criteria and the number of false records is likely larger than we confidently identified.

Updates to the Alvin W. Penn law were made by the legislature in 2012 and went into effect on October 1, 2013. However, CSP has been collecting traffic stop data since at least 2000. Our audit could only review data reported as far back as 2014. The average ratio for overreported records in a given year was 0.029 (another way to view this is that at least 2.9% of records in the racial profiling database were overreported and there is a high likelihood that many of these records are false.) Overreported records were found every year between 2014 and 2021. The largest percentage of overreported records was reported in 2014, although the percentage of overreported records remained significant in each subsequent year. Figure 4.6 shows the ratio of overreported records by year for troopers. Again, there is a high likelihood that the overreported records are false, but the number could be greater when you consider the number of records with significant errors.


**Figure 4. 6: Overreported Racial Profiling Records by Year (Ratio)**



Although there were records that were overreported in each calendar year, the issue varied between Troops. Seven troops exceeded the average for overreported records including Troops B, C, D, E, F, K, and L. Troops C, F, and K had the largest number of overreported records reported to the racial profiling system. Troop F had twice as many overreported records compared to the average troop. Troop K had 1.8 times more overreported records and Troop C had 1.5 times more overreported records. Although Troop E was the primary focus of the investigation conducted by CSP into the false records, Troop E was the troop with only the fifth largest number of overreported records. Troop E's discrepancy in overreported records decreased in 2019, which may correlate with the investigation into the Troop. Troops C, D, E, and K are all located in the Eastern District, and Troop F is located in the Central District but borders Troop E. Troops B and L are located in the Western District, but the rate of overreported records was only marginally above the department average. Figure 4.7 shows the ratio of overreported records by Troop for the combined audit period. Again, there is a high

likelihood that the overreported records are false, but the number could be greater when you consider the number of records with significant errors.

**Figure 4. 7: Overreported and Inaccurate Racial Profiling Records by Troop (Ratio)**



In the aggregate, Troops C, F, and K have the most significant historical discrepancies. However, there are variations in the extent of the discrepancy by year. In more recent years, other troops have emerged with more significant discrepancies. A summary of the discrepancies by troop and year is below. Figures outlining the aggregate ratio of overreported racial profiling records by troop for each calendar year can be found in Appendix A, Figures A.1 through A.8.

#### **IV.A.1: Summary of Overreported Racial Profiling Records by Troop**

**Troop A:** During the combined audit period, Troop A was below the department average for overreported racial profiling records. Although small discrepancies existed in each calendar year, Troop A never exceeded the department average in any year. The largest percentage of overreported records for Troop A occurred in 2014 and 2015, which is unsurprising given that CSP also had the largest percentage of overreported records in those years. There is little evidence of a significant current or historic discrepancy in reported racial profiling records in Troop A.

**Troop B:** During the combined audit period, Troop B was above the department average for overreported racial profiling records. The discrepancies in Troop B were greatest in 2014, 2020, and 2021. Between 2015 and 2019, Troop B was either below or matched the department average in any given year. Although the discrepancy as a ratio of the overall infractions submitted to the racial profiling database increased in 2020 and 2021, the number of records was small. The total number of overreported records in 2020 was 50 and in 2021 it was 38. The increased discrepancies in 2020 and 2021 warrant further monitoring in future years.

**Troop C:** During the combined audit period, Troop C had the fourth-largest discrepancy as a ratio of any troop and exceeded the department discrepancy by 52%. Troop C had the second-largest number of overreported racial profiling records of any troop (4,036 racial profiling records). They exceeded the department average every calendar year. Although their discrepancy has decreased in more recent years, it is still significantly above the department average. The number of overreported racial profiling records in Troop C is significant and we believe there is a pattern of submitting false and inaccurate racial profiling records.

**Troop D:** During the combined audit period, Troop D was above the department average for overreported racial profiling records. Troop D had the third-largest discrepancy of any troop and exceeded the department discrepancy by 65%. The discrepancies in Troop D were greatest in 2014 and 2015. Between 2016 and 2021, Troop D did not exceed the department average. The smallest disparity identified was in the most recent calendar year (2021). Although there is evidence of a historic discrepancy, there is little evidence of a significant discrepancy since 2016.

**Troop E:** During the combined audit period, Troop E was above the department average for overreported racial profiling records. Troop E had the fifth-largest discrepancy of any troop and exceeded the department discrepancy by 21%. In 2014, the discrepancy was above the department average, but in 2015 it was below the department average. There was a small discrepancy above the department average in 2016 but it really grew in 2017 and 2018. There was an 82% decrease in the ratio of overreported racial profiling records in 2019. Troop E has remained below the department average between 2019 and 2021. It is reasonable to assume that the investigation of four Troopers in Troop E for submitting false racial profiling records in late 2018 played a role in addressing this problem. We believe that the small discrepancy that remains is likely indicative of natural human error and can be used as a benchmark to compare the error rate in other troops. The historic discrepancy in Troop E is significant. We believe there is a high probability that between 2016 and 2018 there was a significant number of false and inaccurate records submitted to the racial profiling system in Troop E. However, there is little evidence of a significant discrepancy since 2019.

**Troop F:** During the combined audit period, Troop F had the largest discrepancy of any troop and was twice as large as the department. Troop F had the largest number of overreported racial profiling records of any troop (4,955 racial profiling records). Troop F had a significant discrepancy in every calendar year. Although the discrepancy in 2021 is smaller than in previous years, it remained noticeably above the department average. The number of overreported racial profiling records in Troop F is significant and we believe there is a pattern of submitting false and inaccurate racial profiling records.

**Troop G:** During the combined audit period, Troop G was below the department average for overreported racial profiling records. Although small discrepancies existed in each calendar year, Troop G did not exceed the department average between 2014 and 2020. Troop G exceeded the department average in 2021, but not in a significant manner. The total number of overreported records in 2021 was 97. There is little evidence of a historic discrepancy in reported racial profiling records in Troop G. However, Troop G should be monitored for the increased discrepancy in 2021.

**Troop H:** During the combined audit period, Troop H was below the department average for overreported racial profiling records. Although small discrepancies existed in each calendar year, Troop H did not exceed the department average between 2014 and 2020. Troop H did exceed the department average in 2021. Although the total number of overreported records in 2021 was only 51. There is little evidence of a historic discrepancy in reported racial profiling records in Troop H. However, Troop H should be monitored for the increased discrepancy in 2021.

**Troop I:** During the combined audit period, Troop I was below the department average for overreported racial profiling records. Although small discrepancies existed in each calendar year, Troop I never exceeded the department average in any calendar year. There is little evidence of a current or historic discrepancy in Troop I.

**Troop K:** During the combined audit period, Troop K had the second-largest discrepancy as a ratio of any troop and exceeded the department discrepancy by 79%. Troop K had the third-largest number of overreported racial profiling records of any troop (3,308 racial profiling records). Troop K exceeded the department average every calendar year, except in 2021. The discrepancy decreased below the department average for the first time in 2021. Although their discrepancy has decreased in more recent years, it was still routinely above the average. The number of overreported racial profiling records in Troop K is significant and we believe there is a pattern of submitting false and inaccurate racial profiling records.

**Troop L:** During the combined audit period, Troop L had a discrepancy that was above the department average for overreported racial profiling records. The discrepancies in Troop L were greatest in 2014 and 2015. Between 2016 and 2020, Troop L did not exceed the department average. The discrepancy in Troop L in 2021 was equivalent to the department average. The total number of overreported records in 2021 was only 20. There is little evidence of a significant discrepancy since 2015.

**Headquarters:** During the combined audit period, Headquarters was below the department average for overreported racial profiling records. Although small discrepancies existed in each calendar year, Headquarters never exceeded the department average in a calendar year. There is little evidence of a current or historic discrepancy in Headquarters.

#### **IV.A.2: Identifying Troopers with Overreported Records**

We audited data reported to the racial profiling system by 1,301 troopers which constituted 6,019 trooper-by-year observations. Of the 1,301 troopers, there were 1,052 troopers with at least one overreported racial profiling record between 2014 and 2021. There were 249 troopers that did not have any overreported racial profiling records. The trooper with the largest cumulative number of overreported records (1,350) submitted these records between 2014 and 2017 and was assigned to Troop F. Over 83% of this trooper’s infraction records were overreported. There were 22 troopers that overreported 200 or more cumulative racial profiling records each and accounted for approximately 35% of all overreported records. Although the problem appears to have improved in recent years, 10 of the 22 troopers with the largest number of overreported racial profiling records were still submitting data in 2021. There were 15 troopers that overreported more than 10 racial profiling records in 2021. Table 4.1 lists the number of overreported records for troopers.


**Table 4. 1: Number of Troopers with Overreported Racial Profiling Records**

Overreported Records (#)	Troopers (#)	Overreported Records (#)	Overreported Records (%)
1 to 20	807	4,599	17.7%
21 to 50	132	4,168	16.0%
51 to 100	67	4,720	18.2%
101 to 150	13	1,580	6.1%
151 to 200	11	1,858	7.1%
201 to 300	10	2,548	9.8%
301 to 500	8	3,201	12.3%
500 to 1,000	3	1,942	7.5%
More than 1,000	1	1,350	5.2%



In the 2014-20 racial profiling data, the mean number of unmatched records was 4.7 per trooper in a given year, and the standard deviation was 19.3. Based on the fact that CSP identified this issue in 2019 and arguably should have largely addressed the reporting issue by 2021, we treat 2021 as a counterfactual for the earlier data and assume that any deviations in matching racial profiling to CIB records are largely from measurement error and accidental data entry problems. Using the 2021 mean of 1.1 and standard deviation of 3.9, we set identification criteria for a trooper having more than approximately two standard deviations above the mean in a given year. In other words, we identify troopers with greater than 8 unmatched racial profiling records in any year. Based on these criteria, we identify a total of 311 (24%) troopers ever identified in any year or 618 (10.3%) trooper by year observations. Figure 4.8 plots a histogram of the total volume of unmatched records for identified observations. There were 277 of 618 of the identified observations involved a trooper having more than 20 unmatched racial profiling records (more than 5 standard deviations above the counterfactual mean) in a given year, there were 123 observations involving more than 40 unmatched records in a given year (more than 10 standard deviations above the counterfactual mean)<sup>25</sup>.


**Figure 4. 8: Annual Overreported Racial Profiling Records for Identified Troopers**



The number of troopers that exceeded the criteria of having more than two standard deviations above the counterfactual mean in a given year varied each year. The largest number of troopers meeting our criteria occurred in 2014. The three largest single-year discrepancies were from two individual troopers; one having recorded 570, and 498 unmatched racial profiling records in a single year and another with 408 unmatched racial profiling records in a single year. The total number of troopers meeting the criteria declined each year. However, even after the reporting issue was discovered by CSP in late 2018, a small group of troopers continued to have a significant number of overreported racial profiling records. Figure 4.9 identifies the total number of troopers identified with significant discrepancies in each calendar year.

<sup>25</sup> The counterfactual mean and standard deviation are calculated from the error rates across all officers in the counterfactual year of 2021.

**Figure 4. 9: Number of Troopers Identified by Year**



Since we audited data over an eight year period, a trooper could meet the criteria up to eight times. Of the 1,301 troopers evaluated, the average trooper submitted data to the racial profiling system in at least five of the eight years that were audited. Troopers may not have been employed with CSP during some of the years we audited or may not have submitted any traffic stop records. Of the 311 unique troopers with a discrepancy at least two standard deviations from the counterfactual mean, most were only identified in one or two of the years audit. The number of years that a trooper met our criteria does not indicate the volume of overreported racial profiling records. For example, the trooper with the largest number of discrepancies only reported data between 2014 and 2017. There are four troopers that were identified with a significant number of overreported records in all eight years. 48 of the 311 troopers with significant discrepancies were identified in at least half of the years audited. Figure 4.10 shows the number of times a trooper was identified as overreporting racial profiling records during the audit period.


**Figure 4. 10: Number of Years a Trooper was Identified with Significant Discrepancies**



Although a significant discrepancy may exist in a given year, it is helpful to view the discrepancy as a proportion of the overall number of infraction records that the trooper reported. For example, over 83% of the records reported by the trooper with the largest number of discrepancies were overreported. Whereas, a trooper, also in the top 30 troopers with the most overreported records,


only had a discrepancy in 9% of their records. There were 11 troopers identified that had more than half of their cumulative racial profiling records overreported. Of the 311 troopers identified with significant discrepancies, 47 had more than 25% of their total reported infractions overreported to the racial profiling system. Figure 4.11 shows the percentage of overall infractions overreported by troopers that were identified with a discrepancy more than two standard deviations from the counterfactual mean.

**Figure 4. 11: Percent of Overreported Infractions by Trooper**




In order to better hone the analysis to identify the troopers with the most significant discrepancies, we evaluated both the number of infraction records and the percentage of infraction records overreported by year. In the 2014-20 racial profiling data, the mean percentage of unmatched records was 7.6% per trooper in a given year, and the standard deviation was 19%. Once again, based on the fact that CSP identified this issue in 2018 and arguably should have largely addressed the reporting issue by 2021, we treat 2021 as a counterfactual for the earlier data. Using the 2021 mean of 6% and standard deviation of 19%, we set identification criteria for a trooper above the standard deviation of the mean in a given year. In other words, we identify troopers with greater than 20% of their overall infraction records as unmatched in any year. We combined this with the troopers that had more than 8 unmatched records in a given year. Based on these two criteria, we identify a total of 130 (10%) troopers ever identified in any year or 230 (4%) trooper by year observations as meeting both criteria. Figure 4.12 identifies the total number of troopers identified with significant discrepancies based on the combined criteria in each calendar year.

**Figure 4. 12: Number of Troopers Identified by Year (Combined Criteria)**



Once again, using this criteria, a trooper could be identified up to eight times. Of the 130 unique troopers with a significant discrepancy based on both the number and percentage of unmatched records, most were only identified in one year of the audit. The number of years that a trooper met our criteria does not indicate the volume of overreported racial profiling records. There are two troopers that were identified with a significant number and percentage of overreported records in seven of the eight years. 15 of the 130 troopers with significant discrepancies were identified in at least half of the years audited. Figure 4.13 shows the number of times a trooper was identified as overreporting racial profiling records during the audit period based on the combined identification criteria.

**Figure 4. 13: Number of Years a Trooper was Identified with Significant Discrepancies (Combined Criteria)**



#### **IV.B. AUDIT OF UNDERREPORTED RACIAL PROFILING RECORDS**

According to records provided by the CIB, there were a total of 946,056 infractions recorded by the Connecticut State Police between 2014 and 2021. Most, but not all, of these records likely should have necessitated an entry into the racial profiling database. But there are circumstances where an infraction might be issued, but it would not necessitate the completion of a racial profiling record. A common example is when a trooper issues an infraction as part of the commercial vehicle weight and

safety inspection program. This program consists of certain state police and motor vehicle inspectors, and some local police personnel who have received special training in the enforcement of state and federal laws and regulations that govern the operation of commercial motor vehicles. These groups of law enforcement personnel are commonly referred to as the “truck squads” and they operate primarily at the state’s several permanent truck weighing facilities, although they are also capable of conducting individualized weight and safety inspections away from these fixed facilities.

The racial profiling program exempts completion of racial profiling data when action is taken during a weigh station operation. When the weigh station is in operation, all qualifying commercial vehicles are required to pass through the station for inspection. Since troopers may not have discretion in determining the vehicles, they interact with at a weigh station, the program determined it was not necessary to report these stops to the racial profiling database. However, routine enforcement of traffic laws on individual commercial vehicles must be reported to the racial profiling database.

When a trooper conducts a stop related to a commercial vehicle the activity code that is recorded in the CSP records management system indicates “TSCOMM”. CSP informed us that the designation of a stop as “TSCOMM” does not require or prompt the completion of racial profiling information. This may be a misinterpretation of the law’s requirements. As noted earlier in this report, when the racial profiling traffic stop reporting system was created, a traffic stop was defined as “any time an officer initiates contact with a vehicle resulting in the detention of an individual and/or vehicle”. Contacts involving the provision of motorist assistance, response to a traffic crash, or involving contact with a vehicle that has been linked to a specific incident based on a motor vehicle or a criminal complaint are explicitly excluded from the traffic stop definition. Activities conducted at checkpoints or spot checks are considered reportable officer-initiated traffic stops only if contact with the operator is extended for any purpose. Thus, police conducting things like sobriety checkpoints are only required to report those individuals whom they select for extended interaction. At the time, guidance was provided indicating that commercial weight and safety inspection activities conducted by the truck squads were not subject to reporting to the racial profiling database. There was, however, no blanket exclusion of all stops involving commercial motor vehicles.


CSP provided researchers with records coded as part of commercial activity enforcement that resulted in an electronic ticket. Between 2014 and 2021, there were 39,919 electronic tickets coded as part of commercial enforcement activity. It seems clear from reviewing these records that many of these infractions were likely not to have been issued as part of a weigh station operation and probably should have been reported as routine officer-initiated traffic stops. For example, 1,359 infractions coded as commercial activity were for speeding, 2,135 were for failure to drive on the right side of the road or for operating in the restricted left lane, 714 were for a cell phone violation, and 486 were for failure to wear a seatbelt. Many infractions coded as a commercial activity were clearly part of a weigh station operation, while other infractions are harder to determine. For example, 9,887 infractions were issued for an overweight vehicle, while 2,637 infractions were issued for a generic violation of the state traffic code. There appears to be a misunderstanding or confusion about when to report a commercial vehicle stop to the racial profiling database. As a result of this issue, we removed all commercial vehicle stops from our analysis of underreported racial profiling records.

Another common example of a trooper issuing an infraction that would not prompt the completion of racial profiling data is when a trooper issues an infraction during a crash investigation. Beginning in 2015, the Connecticut Crash Data Repository began collecting information on infractions issued as

part of a crash investigation. This allowed us to better determine how many infractions were submitted to CIB that were associated with a crash and not a traffic stop. Additionally, we were able to identify infractions that were non-traffic-related violations and remove them from our total. Using the matching criteria outlined in our methodology and only considering data between 2015 and 2021, we are left with 16,298 infractions<sup>26</sup> in the CIB database without a corresponding record in the racial profiling database. It is challenging to fully understand the extent of possible underreporting in the racial profiling database, but it appears that at least some records are not being reported to the racial profiling database that should be.

The average ratio for underreported records in a given year was 0.025 (another way to view this is that at least 2.5% of records in the CIB database were underreported.) Underreported records were found every year between 2015 and 2021. The largest percentage of underreported records was reported in 2015, although the percentage of underreported records remained marginally significant in each subsequent year. Figure 4.14 shows the ratio of underreported records by year for troopers. There is a high likelihood that some, if not most, of these records should have necessitated the completion of a racial profiling record as part of the Alvin. W. Penn Act.


**Figure 4. 14: Underreported CIB Records by Year (Ratio)**



Although there were underreported records in each calendar year, the issue varied between Troops. Five troops exceeded the average for underreported records including HQ, Troops B, E, F, and H. It is important to note that the stops submitted as part of HQ predominantly come from the Traffic Services Unit. HQ had the largest number of underreported infractions. Although Troop B had one of the largest percentages of underreported records, the number was relatively small compared to other troops. Figure 4.15 shows the ratio of underreported records by Troop for the combined audit period.

<sup>26</sup> These were only infractions submitted by the 1,301 troopers included in our audit. Troopers that submitted infractions only to CIB and not the racial profiling database were not included in the audit.

**Figure 4. 15: Underreported CIB Records by Troop (Ratio)**



In the aggregate, HQ, Troop H, and Troop F have the most underreported records. However, there are variations in the extent of the discrepancy by year. A summary of the discrepancies by troop and year is below. Figures outlining the aggregate ratio of underreported racial profiling records by troop for each calendar year can be found in Appendix A, Figures A.9 through A.15.

#### **IV.B.1: Summary of Underreported CIB Records by Troop**

**Troop A:** During the combined audit period, Troop A was below the department average for underreported CIB records. Although small discrepancies existed in each calendar year, Troop A never exceeded the department average in any year. There is little evidence of a significant current or historical discrepancy of underreported infractions to the racial profiling database in Troop A.

**Troop B:** During the combined audit period, Troop B had the second-largest discrepancy as a percentage of overall infractions, in underreported records and exceeded the department average by 32%. Troop B exceeded the department average between 2017 and 2021. Although the discrepancy as a ratio of the overall infractions submitted to the CIB database was significant, the number of underreported records was small compared to other troops. The total number of underreported records between 2015 and 2021 was 616. The number of underreported records in each year starting in 2017 was fewer than 100. There is evidence of a marginal discrepancy in underreported records that should be monitored.

**Troop C:** During the combined audit period, Troop C was equivalent to the department average for underreported CIB records. Troop C exceeded the department average in 2016, 2020, and 2021. Although the ratio of underreported records has increased in 2020 and 2021, the overall number is relatively small. The total number of underreported records in 2020 was 121 and in 2021 it was 58. There is evidence of a marginal discrepancy in underreported records that should be monitored.

**Troop D:** During the combined audit period, Troop D was equivalent to the department average for underreported CIB records. Troop D exceeded the department average every year except 2015 and 2021. The number of underreported racial profiling records has decreased in recent years. There is evidence of a marginal discrepancy in underreported records that should be monitored.

**Troop E:** During the combined audit period, Troop E was slightly above the department average for underreported CIB records. Troop E exceeded the department average in 2017 and 2018. The total

number of underreported records between 2015 and 2021 was 1,552. The number of underreported records in each year starting in 2019 was fewer than 100. There were only 26 underreported records in 2021. There is evidence of a marginal historical discrepancy in underreported records, but no evidence of a current discrepancy.

**Troop F:** During the combined audit period, Troop F was above the department average for underreported CIB records. Troop F exceeded the department average for underreported records beginning in 2017. Troop F also had the third-largest number of underreported racial profiling records with 1,927. There is evidence of a historical and current discrepancy in underreported records in Troop F.

**Troop G:** During the combined audit period, Troop G was below the department average for underreported records. Although small discrepancies existed in each calendar year, Troop G never exceeded the department average in any year. There is little evidence of a significant current or historical discrepancy of underreported infractions to the racial profiling database in Troop G.

**Troop H:** During the combined audit period, Troop H had the largest discrepancy as a percentage of overall infractions, in underreported records and exceeded the department average by 40%. Troop H exceeded the department average during each year of the audit. Although the discrepancy as a ratio of the overall infractions submitted to the CIB database was significant, the number of underreported records has declined in recent years. The total number of underreported records between 2015 and 2021 was 2,164. The number of underreported records is significant, and we believe there is a pattern of underreporting these records.

**Troop I:** During the combined audit period, Troop I was below the department average for underreported records. Although small discrepancies existed in each calendar year, Troop I only exceeded the department average in 2014 and was below the average in all other years. There is little evidence of a current or historical discrepancy in Troop I.

**Troop K:** During the combined audit period, Troop K was equivalent to the department average for underreported records. Troop K exceeded the department average in 2015 and 2016 and no other years. The number of underreported racial profiling records has decreased in recent years. There is little evidence of a current or historical discrepancy in Troop K.

**Troop L:** During the combined audit period, Troop L was equivalent to the department average for underreported records. Troop L exceeded the department average every year except 2017, 2018, and 2020. Although the discrepancy as a ratio of the overall infractions submitted to the CIB database was significant in some years, the number of underreported records was small compared to other troops. The total number of underreported records between 2015 and 2021 was 561. The number of underreported records in each year starting in 2017 was fewer than 100. There is evidence of a marginal discrepancy in underreported records that should be monitored.

**Headquarters:** During the combined audit period, Headquarters was above the department average for underreported records. HQ had the largest number of underreported records with 2,239. HQ did not exceed the department average in 2018, 2020, and 2021. There is evidence of a historical discrepancy in underreported records for HQ, but no significant discrepancy since 2019.



#### IV.B.2: Identifying Troopers with Underreported Records

As with overreported records, we also audited data reported to the CIB system by 1,301 troopers which constituted 5,161 trooper-by-year observations. Of the 1,301 troopers, there were 981 troopers with at least one underreported record between 2015 and 2021. There were 320 troopers that did not have any underreported records. The trooper with the largest number of underreported records (247) submitted these records to CIB between 2015 and 2016 and was assigned to Headquarters. Approximately 12% of this trooper’s infractions were likely underreported. There were 16 troopers that underreported more than 100 records and accounted for approximately 14% of all underreported records. Although the problem appears to have improved in recent years, 8 of the 16 troopers with the largest number of underreported records were still submitting data in 2021. There were 6 troopers that underreported more than 10 records in 2021. Table 4.2 lists the total number of underreported records for troopers between 2015 and 2021.

**Table 4. 2: Number of Troopers with Underreported Records**


Underreported Records (#)	Troopers (#)	Underreported Records (#)	Underreported Records (%)
1 to 20	733	5,111	31.3%
21 to 50	184	5,742	35.2%
51 to 100	49	3,294	20.2%
101 to 150	10	1,167	7.2%
151 to 247	5	984	6.1%

In the 2015-20 CIB data, the mean number of unmatched records was 3.5 per trooper in a given year, and the standard deviation was 8.1<sup>27</sup>. Based on the fact that CSP identified this issue in 2019 and arguably should have largely addressed the reporting issue by 2021, we treat this year as a counterfactual for the earlier data and assume that any deviations in matching racial profiling to CIB records are largely from measurement error and accidental data entry problems. Using the 2021 mean of 0.67 and standard deviation of 1.9, we set identification criteria for a trooper having more than approximately two standard deviations above the mean in a given year. In other words, we identify troopers with greater than 4 unmatched CIB records in any year. Based on these criteria, we identify a total of 542 (42%) troopers ever identified in any year or 985 (34.4%) troopers by year observations. Figure 4.16 plots a histogram of the total volume of unmatched records for identified observations. While the majority (501 of 985) of the identified observations involved a trooper having more than 9 unmatched CIB records (more than 4 standard deviations above the counterfactual mean) in a given year, there were 106 observations involving more than 25 unmatched records in a given year (more than 13 standard deviations above the counterfactual mean<sup>28</sup>).

<sup>27</sup> Note that these totals exclude the total records in the crash system from 2015-21. We exclude 2014 from the officer totals as we don’t have reliable data on the total tickets associated with crash incidents.


<sup>28</sup> The counterfactual mean and standard deviation are calculated from the error rates across all officers in the counterfactual year of 2021.

**Figure 4. 16: Annual Underreported Records for Identified Troopers**



The number of troopers that exceeded the criteria of having more than two standard deviations above the mean in a given year varied each year. The largest number of troopers meeting our criteria occurred in 2015. The three largest discrepancies were individual troopers having underreported 161, 122, and 112 CIB records in a single year. The total number of troopers meeting the criteria declined each year. However, even after the reporting issue was discovered by CSP in late 2018, a smaller group of troopers continued to have a large number of underreported records. In fact, the trooper with the largest discrepancy in 2021 was identified with a large number of underreported records in three of the seven audit years. Figure 4.17 identifies the total number of troopers identified with significant discrepancies in each calendar year.


**Figure 4. 17: Number of Troopers Identified by Year**



Since we audited data over a seven year period, a trooper could meet the criteria up to seven times. Of the 1,301 troopers evaluated, the average trooper submitted data to the CIB system in at least four of the seven years that were audited. Troopers may not have been employed with CSP during some of the years we audited or may not have submitted any infraction records. Of the 542 unique troopers with a discrepancy in at least one year, most were only identified in one or two of the years audited. The number of years that a trooper met our criteria does not indicate the volume of underreported


records. There was one trooper identified with a significant number of underreported records in six of the seven years. 39 of the 542 troopers with significant discrepancies were identified in at least four of the seven years audited. Figure 4.18 shows the number of times a trooper was identified as underreporting more than two standard deviations above the counterfactual mean during the audit period.

**Figure 4. 18: Number of Years a Trooper was Identified with Significant Discrepancies**



Although a significant discrepancy may exist in a given year, it is helpful to view the discrepancy as a proportion of the overall number of infractions that the trooper reported. For example, 67% of the records reported by the trooper with the third- largest number of discrepancies were underreported. Whereas, the trooper with the largest number of underreported records, only had a discrepancy of 12% of their records. There were 17 troopers identified that had more than half of their records underreported. Of the 542 troopers identified with significant discrepancies, only 42 had more than 25% of their total reported infractions likely not submitted to the racial profiling database. Figure 4.19 shows the percentage of overall infractions underreported by troopers.


**Figure 4. 19: Percent of Underreported Infractions by Trooper**



To better hone the analysis to identify the troopers with the most significant discrepancies, we evaluated both the number of infraction records and the percentage of infractions underreported by


year. In the 2015-20 data, the mean percentage of underreported records was 6.9 percent per trooper in a given year, and the standard deviation was 14 percent. Once again, based on the fact that CSP identified this issue in 2019 and arguably should have largely addressed the reporting issue by 2021, we treat 2021 as a counterfactual for the earlier data. Using the 2021 mean of 4.6% and standard deviation of 13%, we set identification criteria for a trooper above the standard deviation of the mean in a given year. In other words, we identify troopers with greater than 13 percent of their overall infraction records underreported in any year. We combined this with the troopers that had more than 4 underreported records in a year. Based on these two criteria, we identify a total of 192 (15%) troopers ever identified in any year. Figure 4.20 identifies the total number of troopers identified with discrepancies based on the combined criteria in each calendar year.

**Figure 4. 20: Number of Troopers Identified by Year (Combined Criteria)**



Once again, using the combined criteria, a trooper could be identified up to seven times. Of the 192 unique troopers with a significant discrepancy based on both the number and percentage of unmatched records, most were only identified in one year of the audit. The number of years that a trooper met our criteria does not indicate the volume of underreported racial profiling records. No trooper was identified in more than five of the years audited. Figure 4.21 shows the number of times a trooper was identified as underreporting racial profiling records during the audit period based on the combined identification criteria.


**Figure 4. 21: Number of Years a Trooper was Identified with Discrepancies (Combined Criteria)**



#### IV.C. IMPACT ON RACIAL PROFILING REPORTS

In addition to better understanding the extent of overreported racial profiling records and underreported CIB records by troop and trooper, we also wanted to evaluate whether the characteristics of the overreported and underreported records varied from the records that we could confirm as real. Therefore, we compare characteristics of records matched between the racial profiling system with unmatched records from the system. First, we evaluated the relative number of unmatched records from the racial profiling dataset by hour of the day.<sup>29</sup> As shown in Figure 4.22, the relative number of unmatched racial profiling records reaches peaks at 3 to 4 a.m. and 2 to 3 p.m. when overall traffic volume is low while there are troughs between 7 and 9 a.m. and 3 and 5 p.m. when traffic volume is high. The peaks when records are more likely to be overreported appear to occur toward the end of a shift. Given the timing of the overreported records, it is likely that these may have affected the results of the Veil of Darkness analysis.


**Figure 4. 22: Unmatched Racial Profiling Records by Hour**



Next, we examined the difference between matched and unmatched racial profiling records by race and ethnicity. As shown in Figure 4.23, unmatched records were 9.65pp (14.12%,  $p < 0.001$ ) more likely to be reported as White non-Hispanic while -4.44pp (-33.9%,  $p < 0.001$ ) less likely to be Black, -4.59pp (-31.36%,  $p < 0.001$ ) less likely to be Hispanic, and -0.73pp (-15.92%,  $p < 0.001$ ) less likely to be reported as other or have no race/ethnicity information. In other words, the analysis finds that the unmatched RP records are more likely to be White non-Hispanic relative to minority.


<sup>29</sup> Note that we don't plot unmatched CIB records because we do not have a timestamp on files not linked to the racial profiling data.

**Figure 4. 23: Unmatched Racial Profiling Records by Race and Ethnicity**



We also examined the difference between matched and unmatched CIB records that we believe should have been submitted to the racial profiling database by race and ethnicity. As shown in Figure 4.24, unmatched records were -6.69pp (11.29%,  $p < 0.001$ ) less likely to be reported as White non-Hispanic and -2.68pp (-2.2%,  $p < 0.001$ ) less likely to be Black while 1.43pp (18.83%,  $p < 0.005$ ) more likely to be Hispanic, and 5.54pp (26.16%,  $p < 0.001$ ) more likely to be reported as other or have no race/ethnicity information. In other words, the analysis finds that the unmatched CIB records are less likely to be White non-Hispanic relative to minority.


**Figure 4. 24: Unmatched CIB Records by Race and Ethnicity**




Motivated by the prior set of results which show discernible differences in the matched records when compared to the unmatched racial profiling and CIB records, we examine how these differences impact the overall racial/ethnic composition of the traffic stops. Panel (a) of Figure 4.25 reports that 68.3% of the raw unadjusted racial profiling infractions involved a White non-Hispanic motorist. Excluding unmatched records, we find a statistically significant decline of 0.32pp dropping the share of White non-Hispanic motorists to 67.98%. Panel (b) reports that 14.54% of the unadjusted racial profiling infractions involved a Black motorist but excluding unmatched records increased the share to 14.69%. Panel (c) reports that 13.14% of the unadjusted racial profiling infractions involved a

Hispanic motorist but excluding unmatched records increased the share to 13.29%. While we focus our analysis on changes to the racial/ethnic composition of infractions, we note that our approach is admittedly conservative as it does not adjust for unmatched CIB records or attempt to reconcile any of the warnings data. This analysis suggests that the demographics recorded in the unmatched and potentially false racial profiling records has most likely had a substantive and statistically significant impact on statistics and empirical tests related to the share of minority motorists stopped.


**Figure 4. 25: Estimated Change to Racial and Ethnic Composition of Traffic Stops**



(a) Share White non-Hispanic by Sample



(b) Share Black by Sample



(c) Share Hispanic/Latinx by Sample

## V. AUDIT FINDINGS (CONSTABLES)

Our audit was more limited in our ability to evaluate constables due to how their records were maintained. In particular, the badge number assigned to a constable always begins with the letter associated with the troop barracks where the constabulary town resides and the letter “C” for constable. The badge number is then followed by at least two numerical numbers between 1 and 99. For example, a constable working in Southbury, which is located within Troop A, could have the badge number AC01. When completing an infraction, many constables would simply record the badge number as a number and drop the letters. When the letters are removed, the badge number could overlap with a trooper’s badge number. In the cases where the letters were dropped from the badge number on an infraction, we used the location provided on the infraction to determine whether it was a constable that likely issued the infraction<sup>30</sup>.

Although we were unable to conduct the same sophisticated statistical analysis for constables as we conducted for troopers, we were able to develop a descriptive methodology for auditing constables, which also acted as a robustness check on the trooper analysis. In this method, once the records were matched between the racial profiling and CIB systems, we simply counted the total number of infractions reported to the racial profiling system and the total number of infractions reported to the CIB system in a given year. There should never be more infractions reported by an officer to the racial profiling system than infractions reported to the CIB system. However, there can be more infractions in the CIB system for an officer because infractions can be issued for violations that are not related to a traffic stop. Racial profiling records are only required when a traffic stop is conducted. For example, an officer may issue an infraction as part of a crash investigation or to an individual who is observed to be jaywalking. In those cases, CIB would have a record of the infraction, but it is not related to a traffic stop.

Using the descriptive method, each Constable was audited by year to determine if any discrepancy between the two systems exists. Table 5.1 is an example of the information that was generated for each constable by calendar year as part of the descriptive audit. We identify the constables internal ID number, their badge number, the total number of infractions submitted to the racial profiling database, the total number of infractions submitted to CIB, and the total number of infractions in the CIB system that could not be related to a traffic stop. Equation 1 outlines how the discrepancy was derived for each Constable.

$$\text{Equation 1: } =\text{Sum}(\text{RP Database Infractions} - (\text{CIB Infractions} - \text{CIB Non Traffic Infractions}))$$

**Table 5. 1: Example of Descriptive Methodology**

NexGen ID	Badge #	Racial Profiling Database Infractions	CIB Infractions	CIB Non-Traffic related Infractions	Discrepancy
10000000	300	300	250	50	<b>100</b>

<sup>30</sup> CSP personnel stated that it is possible that local towns independently assign badge numbers to constables that may not correspond with the badge number assigned by CSP.



In the example outlined in Table 5.1, the constable reported 300 infractions to the racial profiling database. The CIB database only had a record of 250 infractions written by this constable. Of the 250 infractions in the official judiciary record, 50 of those infractions were for an offense not related to a traffic violation. In this example, at least 50 of the 250 CIB infractions would not require a racial profiling record. That means that this constable overreported and potentially falsified at least 100 records submitted to the racial profiling system.

We identified two issues related to the reporting of racial profiling records by constables. There are constables with discrepancies between the racial profiling database and the CIB database where more records were reported to the racial profiling database. Based on our analysis, we are confident that traffic stop records in the racial profiling database were most likely falsified by some constables. Additionally, we found that there were also discrepancies where there were more records in the CIB database, after accounting for infractions issued for non-traffic related violations<sup>31</sup>, compared to the racial profiling system. In this case, we believe it is likely that some of these records were underreported to the racial profiling system, in violation of the Alvin W. Penn Act. In order to fully explain the difference between the issue of overreported records and underreported records in the racial profiling database, we present our findings separately.

A final limitation of the audit of constables was understanding the impact that these issues had on the overall analysis conducted of racial and ethnic disparities. The low historical volume of traffic stops conducted by constables likely means that any discrepancies only had a small impact, if any, on our annual analysis.


In the racial profiling database, there were a total of 107,114 unique traffic stops made by constables from 2014 to 2021. Of these unique traffic stops, 38,528 (36%) were recorded as resulting in an infraction. According to records provided by the Centralized Infractions Bureau (CIB), there were a total of 38,420 infractions<sup>32</sup> recorded by constables over the same period. Traffic enforcement declined by 44% between 2014 and 2021 for constables. Prior to the pandemic, traffic enforcement declined by 20% between 2014 and 2019. Every year, constables issue more warnings than infractions, which is consistent with trends in most municipal police departments. Figure 5.1 shows the total number of stops by disposition reported to have been made by constables during the audit period.

---

<sup>31</sup> We were unable to account for infractions issued during a crash due to constables frequently reporting the wrong badge number in both the crash reporting system and CIB database.


<sup>32</sup> This total includes all infractions submitted to CIB including infractions relating to a crash or non-traffic related violations.

**Figure 5. 1: Total Number of Stops by Disposition**



Researchers reviewed data submitted by 373 Constables<sup>33</sup>. Constables needed to submit at least one infraction to the racial profiling database in order to be evaluated in our analysis. The average number of Constables submitting racial profiling records each year was 165. The total number of constables submitting records each calendar year declined by 33% between 2014 and 2021. Figure 5.2 shows the total number of constables that reported racial profiling records each year.


**Figure 5. 2: Number of Constables submitting records to RP System**



There are only ten troop barracks with constabulary towns within their borders. Troop G does not have any constable towns within their jurisdiction. The most constables are in towns within the boundaries of Troop E and Troop A. Montville is located in Troop E and has the most constables assigned to it. Troop A has six towns with constables, with Oxford and Southbury having the most. Figure 5.3 is the total number of constables that submitted racial profiling records by troop during the audit period.

<sup>33</sup> For the purposes of this report, the term Constables refers to sworn personnel employed by a municipality that is under the command of the Connecticut State Police and does not distinguish between ranks.

**Figure 5. 3: Total Number of Constables Submitting Racial Profiling Records in towns within Troop Boundaries**




### **V.A. AUDIT OF OVERREPORTED RACIAL PROFILING RECORDS**

The descriptive methodology for auditing records generally included a year-by-year evaluation of total number of infractions reported to the racial profiling system and the total number of infractions reported to the CIB system. As stated previously, there should never be more infractions reported by an officer to the racial profiling system than infractions reported to the CIB system. However, there can be more infractions in the CIB system for an officer because infractions can be issued for violations that are not related to a traffic stop. Racial profiling records are only required when a traffic stop is conducted.

In the racial profiling database, we found at least 7,427 traffic stops listed as having resulted in an infraction that were overreported. We believe that at least 7,427 traffic stop records in the racial profiling database are most likely records that were falsified by constables. We allowed for extremely loose matching criteria and the number of falsified records is likely larger than we confidently identified.

The average ratio for overreported records by constables in a given year was 0.19 (another way to view this is that at least 19% of records in the racial profiling database were overreported and there was a high likelihood that they were falsified.) Overreported records were found every year between 2014 and 2021. The largest percentage of overreported records was reported in 2019, although the percentage of overreported records remained significant each year. Figure 5.4 shows the ratio of overreported records by year for constables. Again, there is a high likelihood that at a minimum these records were falsified, but the number could be greater.

**Figure 5. 4: Overreported Racial Profiling Records by Year (Ratio)**




For the purpose of generally understanding the areas where overreported records were more frequently submitted, we decided to aggregate constable information at the troop level<sup>34</sup>. For example, a Southbury constable would be included in the aggregate summary for Troop A and a constable in Deep River would be included in the summary for Troop F. There are 10 troops with constable towns within their jurisdiction. We did not present any troop level results if there were fewer than 100 total overreported racial profiling records during the audit period. Constables within Troop B boundaries only had 13 overreported racial profiling records, Troop D had 44 overreported records, and Troop H had 68 overreported records. Troops B, D, and H had very few constables during the audit period. The small number of overreported records in each of these areas is not significant and they were excluded from the aggregate data summary. However, individual constables with discrepancies were included in the audit of individual constables.

Although there were overreported records in each calendar year, the issue varied between constable towns. Constables towns within three troop jurisdictions exceeded the average for overreported records including Troops A, E, and F. This is unsurprising given that these same areas have the largest number of constables. Constables in Troop E, which only includes Montville, had the largest number of overreported infractions accounting for 34% of all overreported records for Constable towns. Constables in Troop E had 1.4 times more overreported infractions than the second largest jurisdiction, which was Troop F. Figure 5.5 shows the ratio of overreported records for Constables by Troop for the combined audit period. Again, there is a high likelihood that at a minimum, these records were falsified, but the number could be greater.

---

<sup>34</sup> The troop barracks does not have oversight responsibilities of the constable towns. However, in many cases a resident state trooper is assigned to oversee the constable operation.

**Figure 5. 5: Overreported Racial Profiling Records by Troop (Ratio)**



In the aggregate, constables within the boundaries of Troops A, E, and F have the most significant historical discrepancies. However, there are variations in the extent of the discrepancy by year. A summary of the discrepancies by troop and year is below. Figures outlining the aggregate ratio of overreported records submitted to the racial profiling system by constables within troop boundaries for each calendar year can be found in Appendix B, Figures B.1 through B.8.

#### **V.A.1: Summary of Overreported Racial Profiling Records by Troop Jurisdiction**

**Troop A:** There are six towns within the boundaries of Troop A that employ constables. They include Bridgewater, New Fairfield, Oxford, Redding, Roxbury, and Southbury. During the combined audit period, constables within these six towns were above the average for overreported racial profiling records. Troop A constables exceeded the average ratio of overreported racial profiling records every year, except 2014. Although they had the largest ratio of overreported records, they had the third largest number of overreported records. The number of overreported racial profiling records by constables in Troop A is significant and we believe there is a pattern of falsifying records.

**Troop C:** There are three towns within the boundaries of Troop C that employ constables. They include Ellington, Somers, and Stafford. During the combined audit period, constables within these three towns were below the average for overreported racial profiling records. Troop C constables never exceeded the average ratio of overreported racial profiling records in any given year. Constables in Troop C had a marginally significant discrepancy that appears to have improved in 2020 and 2021.

**Troop E:** Montville is the only town within the boundaries of Troop E that employs constables. Montville employs the largest number of constables (25) of any constabulary town in Connecticut. During the combined audit period, Montville constables were above the average for overreported racial profiling records. They exceeded the average ratio of overreported racial profiling records in five of the eight years. They did not exceed the average in 2015, 2020, and 2021. Although they had the second-largest ratio of overreported records, they had the largest number of overreported records. The number of overreported racial profiling records by constables in Montville is significant and we believe there was a pattern of falsifying records. The issue appears to have improved in 2020 and 2021.

**Troop F:** There are five towns within the boundaries of Troop F that employ constables. They include Chester, Deep River, Essex, Old Lyme, and Westbrook. During the combined audit period, constables within these five towns were above the average for overreported racial profiling records. Troop F constables exceeded the average ratio of overreported racial profiling records in five of the eight years. They did not exceed the average in 2014, 2016, and 2021. Although they had the third-largest ratio of overreported records, they had the second-largest number of overreported records. The number of overreported racial profiling records by constables in Troop F is significant and we believe there was a pattern of falsifying records. The issue appears to have improved in 2021.

**Troop I:** There are three towns within the boundaries of Troop I that employ constables. They include Beacon Falls, Bethany, and Prospect. During the combined audit period, constables within these three towns were below the average for overreported racial profiling records. Although small discrepancies existed in each calendar year, constables in Troop I only exceeded the department average in 2015 and 2021. Over the combined audit period, there were only 188 overreported racial profiling records by constables in Troop I. Two constables within Troop I accounted for 78% of all the overreported records. There is little evidence of a current or historic discrepancy for constables in Troop I.

**Troop K:** There are five towns within the boundaries of Troop K that employ constables. They include Colchester, East Haddam, Hebron, Lebanon, and Marlborough. During the combined audit period, constables within these five towns were below the average for overreported racial profiling records. Although small discrepancies existed in each calendar year, constables in Troop K only exceeded the department average in 2021. Although constables in Troop K exceeded the average as a ratio of all infractions reported, the total number of overreported infractions was small (25). There is little evidence of a current or historic discrepancy for constables in Troop K.

**Troop L:** There are five towns within the boundaries of Troop L that employ constables. They include Bethlehem, Burlington, Litchfield, Washington, and Woodbury. During the combined audit period, constables within these five towns were below the average for overreported racial profiling records. Although small discrepancies existed in each calendar year, constables in Troop L only exceeded the department average in 2021. Although constables in Troop L exceeded the average as a ratio of all infractions reported, the total number of overreported infractions was small (25). It is worth noting that in 2021, only one constable in Troop L overreported racial profiling records. There is little evidence of a current or historic discrepancy for constables in Troop L.

## **V.A.2: Identifying Constables with Overreported Records**


We audited data reported to the racial profiling system by 373 constables which constituted 1,321 constable-by-year observations. Of the 373 constables, there were 232 constables with at least one overreported racial profiling record between 2014 and 2021. There were 141 constables that did not have any overreported racial profiling records. The constable with the largest number of overreported records (352) submitted these records between 2014 and 2021 and was working in Montville. Over 98% of the constable's infractions were overreported. There were 20 constables that overreported more than 100 racial profiling records and accounted for approximately 57% of all overreported records by constables. Although the problem appears to have improved in recent years, 15 of the 20 constables with the largest number of overreported racial profiling records were still submitting data in 2021. There were 9 constables that overreported more than 10 racial profiling records in 2021. Table 5.1 lists the number of overreported records for constables.

**Table 5. 2: Number of Constables with Overreported Racial Profiling Records**

# Overreported Records	# of Constables	Total # of all Overreported Records	% of all Overreported Records
1 to 20	160	849	11.4%
21 to 50	36	1,211	16.3%
51 to 100	16	1,149	15.5%
101 to 150	5	606	8.2%
151 to 200	5	837	11.3%
201 to 300	7	1,800	24.2%
More than 300	3	970	13.1%

In the 2014-20 racial profiling data, the mean number of unmatched records for constables was 5.99 per constable in a given year, and the standard deviation was 16.49. Based on the fact that CSP identified this issue in 2019 and arguably should have largely addressed the reporting issue by 2021, we treat this year as a counterfactual for the earlier data and assume that any deviations in matching racial profiling to CIB records are largely from measurement error and accidental data entry problems. Using the 2021 mean of 2.21 and standard deviation of 5.85, we set identification criteria for a constable having more than approximately two (1.96) standard deviations above the mean in a given year. In other words, we identify constables with greater than 11 unmatched racial profiling records in any year. Based on these criteria, we identify a total of 76 (20.4%) constables ever identified in any year or 158 (12%) constables by year observations. Figure 5.6 plots a histogram of the total volume of unmatched records for identified observations. While the majority (113 of 158) of the identified observations involved a constable having more than 18 unmatched racial profiling records (more than 3 standard deviations above the counterfactual mean) in a given year, there were 22 observations involving more than 71 unmatched records in a given year (more than 12 standard deviations above the counterfactual mean).


**Figure 5. 6: Annual Unmatched Racial Profiling Records for Identified Constables**



The number of constables that exceeded the criteria of having more than two standard deviations above the mean in a given year varied each year. The largest number of constables meeting our

criteria occurred in 2014, but the number of constables with large discrepancies was fairly consistent between 2017 and 2019. The largest discrepancy was from a constable in Troop F having recorded 184 unmatched racial profiling records in a single year. The total number of constables meeting the criteria started to decline in 2020 and 2021. However, even after the reporting issue was discovered by CSP in late 2018, a small group of constables continued to have a significant number of overreported racial profiling records. Figure 5.7 identifies the total number of constables with significant discrepancies in each calendar year.


**Figure 5. 7: Number of Constables Identified by Year**



Since we audited data over an eight year period, a constable could meet the criteria up to eight times. Of the 373 constables evaluated, the average constables submitted data to the racial profiling system in at least three of the eight years that were audited. Constables may not have been employed during some of the years we audited or may not have submitted any traffic stop records. Of the 76 unique constables with a significant discrepancy, most were only identified in one or two of the years. The number of years that a constable met our criteria does not indicate the volume of overreported racial profiling records. No constables were identified in all eight years of the audit. There are four constables that were identified with a significant number of overreported records in six of the eight years. There were 13 of the 76 constables with significant discrepancies that were identified in at least half of the years audited. Figure 5.8 shows the number of times a constable was identified as overreporting racial profiling records during the audit period.




**Figure 5. 8: Number of Years a Constable was Identified with Significant Discrepancies**



Although a significant discrepancy may exist in a given year, it is helpful to view the discrepancy as a proportion of the overall number of infractions that the constable reported. For example, over 98% of the records reported by the constable with the largest number of discrepancies were overreported and likely falsified. Whereas, a constable, also in the top 20 most overreported records, only had a discrepancy of 9% of their records. There were 40 constables identified that had more than half of their racial profiling records overreported and likely falsified. Of the 76 constables identified with significant discrepancies, 59 had more than 25% of their total reported infractions likely falsified. Table 5.9 shows the percentage of overall infractions overreported by constables.


**Figure 5. 9: Percent of Overreported Infractions by Constable**



In order to better hone the analysis to identify the constables with the most significant discrepancies, we evaluated both the number of infraction records and the percentage of infractions overreported by year. In the 2014-20 racial profiling data, the mean percentage of unmatched records was 24 percent per trooper in a given year, and the standard deviation was 36.9 percent. Once again, based on the fact that CSP identified this issue in 2019 and arguably should have largely addressed the reporting issue by 2021, we treat 2021 as a counterfactual for the earlier data. Using the 2021 mean of 22 percent and standard deviation of 36.7 percent, we set identification criteria for a trooper above


the standard deviation of the mean in a given year. In other words, we identify troopers with greater than 36.7 percent of their overall infraction records as unmatched in any year. We combined this with the troopers that had more than 11 unmatched records in any year. Based on these two criteria, we identify a total of 63 (17%) constables ever identified in any year as meeting both criteria. Figure 5.10 identifies the total number of constables identified with discrepancies based on the combined criteria in each calendar year.

**Figure 5. 10: Number of Constables Identified by Year (Combined Criteria)**



Once again, using this criteria, a constable could be identified up to eight times. Of the 63 unique constables with a significant discrepancy based on both the number and percentage of unmatched records, most were only identified in one year of the audit. The number of years that a constable met our criteria does not indicate the volume of overreported racial profiling records. There are three constables that was identified with a significant number and percentage of overreported records in six of the eight years. Eight of the 63 constables with significant discrepancies were identified in at least half of the years audited. Figure 5.11 shows the number of times a constable was identified as overreporting racial profiling records during the audit period based on the combined identification criteria.

**Figure 5. 11: Number of Years a Constable was Identified with Significant Discrepancies (Combined Criteria)**




## V.B. AUDIT OF UNDERREPORTED RACIAL PROFILING RECORDS

According to records provided by the CIB, there were a total of 38,420 infractions recorded by the constables between 2014 and 2021. We determined that at least 1,861 infractions were for non-moving, or traffic stop related violations. Beginning in 2015, the Connecticut Crash Data Repository began collecting information on infractions issued as part of a crash investigation. This could allow us to better determine how many infractions were submitted to CIB that were associated with a crash and not a traffic stop. Unfortunately, for constables, we were unable to account for infractions issued during a crash. Constables frequently reported the wrong badge number in both the crash reporting system and CIB database. Therefore, we could not accurately match infraction issued during a crash to the appropriate constable. That being said, we determined that there were 7,319 infractions submitted to the CIB database that could have been issued as a result of a traffic stop or crash. Only infractions that resulted from a traffic stop need to be reported to the racial profiling database.

Although we do not know exactly how many of the 7,319 infractions were underreported to the racial profiling system, it is reasonable to assume that some of them should have been reported. Between 2015 and 2021, 11.2% of all infractions submitted by troopers were the result of a crash. If we assume that 11% of infractions submitted by constables were also the result of a crash, then 4,226 of the 7,319 underreported infractions would be crash related. Based on this assumption, that would still leave 3,093 infractions that should have likely been reported by constables to the racial profiling database. We believe that between 8% and 19% of infractions submitted by constables to CIB were underreported to the racial profiling database.

To determine whether there was a trend in underreported infractions, we reviewed underreported records by year, which includes infractions related to a crash. Underreported records were found every year. The largest percentage of underreported records was reported in 2017, and the percentage of underreported records appears to have declined substantially in each subsequent year. Figure 5.10 shows the ratio of underreported records by year for constables. We believe that at least some of these records should have necessitated the completion of a racial profiling record as part of the Alvin. W. Penn Act.

**Figure 5. 12: Underreported CIB Records by Year (Ratio)**



We attempted to audit underreported records for each of the 373 constables. However, we are less confident in our individual results of underreported records for constables due to the data reporting

issues we previously outlined. There were 16 constables with more than 100 underreported infractions during the audit period. These 16 constables accounted for 60% of the underreported infractions. Even if we assume that half of the underreported records were related to a crash, these 16 constables would still have a large number of underreported records. Although we are unable to fully audit these records for individual constables, we do believe that the issue of underreported infractions to the racial profiling system should be further investigated by CSP.

### **V.C. IMPACT ON RACIAL PROFILING REPORTS**

In addition to better understanding the extent of overreported racial profiling records and underreported CIB records by constables, we also wanted to evaluate whether the characteristics of the overreported and underreported records varied from the records that we could confirm as real. Unfortunately, a significant limitation of the audit of constables was being able to fully understand the impact that overreported and underreported records had on the overall analysis conducted of racial and ethnic disparities. Since our methodology for evaluating constables did not allow us to match specific records between the racial profiling and CIB systems, we cannot assess differences in demographic information between the records. Historically, constables do not contribute more than 4.6% of all infractions reported under the umbrella of State Police. The low volume of traffic stops conducted by constables likely means that any discrepancies only had a small impact, if any, on our overall annual analysis.

## VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Connecticut Racial Profiling Prohibition Project advisory board authorized a comprehensive audit of racial profiling records submitted by the Connecticut State Police between January 1, 2014, and December 31, 2021. The board was concerned that racial profiling records may have been intentionally falsified by troopers and constables. The audit was designed to determine if there was merit to this concern and if so, the extent of any problems.

The audit makes the following general findings:

1. The analysis identifies a significant number of unsubstantiated infraction records that were submitted to the racial profiling database by both troopers and constables during all years of the audit. Based on the analysis, we have a high level of confidence that false and inaccurate records were submitted to the racial profiling database.
  - a. The most significant impact of false and inaccurate records occurred between 2014 and 2018. Although the number of unsubstantiated records has declined, the problem still persisted through 2021.
2. Some infractions reported to the Centralized Infractions Bureau appear to have met the criteria for submission to the racial profiling system but were not reported. This is a violation of the reporting requirements of the Alvin W. Penn Act.
3. The analysis found that the demographics recorded for records where there is a high level of confidence that the information is false or inaccurate had a substantive and statistically significant impact on our previously published analyses.
  - a. Overreported records with evidence of false or inaccurate data were more likely to be reported as White drivers and less likely to be reported as Black or Hispanic drivers.
  - b. Records that were underreported by troopers were more likely to be Hispanic or some other race and less likely to be White.

This report suggests a historical pattern and practice among some troopers and constables of submitting infraction records that were likely false or inaccurate to the racial profiling system. The issue appears to have been more prominent in Troop F in the Central District and throughout all the troops in the Eastern District. There were 311 troopers and 76 constables with a statistically significant number of unsubstantiated records in at least one year of the audit. When using the more restrictive identification criteria that include both the number of unmatched records and the percentage of unmatched records there were 130 troopers and 63 constables identified in at least one year of the audit.

Given the rigorous review of infraction records, we have a high degree of confidence that we have identified both false and inaccurate records. What we are not able to determine is the intention or motivation for submitting these records, nor were we attempting to do so in this audit. For our purposes, whether records were intentionally falsified, resulted from carelessness, or human error is not part of the scope of this audit. All false records, i.e., those that do not accurately reflect real events, affect our ability to analyze the data equally. Identifying statistically significant discrepancies can be evidence of wrongdoing but a formal investigation would need to confirm that, and that is beyond the scope of our audit. A key distinction between this audit and the internal affairs investigation conducted into the four troopers from Troop E referenced in this report is that the investigators conducted interviews with most of the CSP personnel investigated. In most cases, the trooper admitted the wrongdoing and was able to shed some light on the motivation behind their actions. When we identify records as “false” it is because they fail to meet any of the thresholds we

established to try and link them to a real CIB infraction record, no matter how tenuous that linkage might have been.

We also wish to highlight that while the audit found a meaningful number of troopers and constables with reporting discrepancies, we also identified troopers that appeared to have reported their stops accurately or with only minimal discrepancies and they should be recognized for their performance of their duties.

## **VI.A: Summary of Trooper Audit Findings**

### ***Overreported Racial Profiling Records:***

Researchers reviewed 804,063 infractions submitted by 1,301 troopers between January 1, 2014, and December 31, 2021. We were unable to audit stops that resulted in other dispositions such as a warning. Based on our criteria, the range of overreported racial profiling records could be as large as 58,553 and as small as 25,966. We have a high degree of confidence that at least 25,966 traffic stop records submitted to the racial profiling database are false and inaccurate. Our methodology allowed for an extremely loose matching criterion and the number of false records is likely larger than we confidently identified.

Records contained significantly more errors between 2014 and 2016, which may explain the larger number of overreported records during those years. Although the share of overreported records improved between 2019 and 2021, there were still overreported records in those years.

Troops C, F, and K had the largest number of discrepancies resulting in overreported records. Troop F had twice as many overreported records compared to the average troop. Troop K had 1.8 times more overreported records and Troop C had 1.5 times more overreported records. Troops B, D, E and L also had large discrepancies. Of these seven troops, four make up the entire Eastern District (Troops C, D, E, and K), Troop F is in the Central District, but borders the Eastern District, and Troops B and L are located in the Western District. Troop E's discrepancy decreased markedly in 2019, which appears to correlate with the internal investigation into the troop. We have a high degree of confidence based on the data analysis that there was a pattern and practice of submitting false and inaccurate records to the racial profiling database in these seven troops, but especially in Troops C, F, and K.

Of the 1,301 troopers we audited, 311 had a statistically significant number of discrepancies in at least one year of the audit. Many of these troopers were more than five standard deviations above the counterfactual mean and more than 100 troopers were more than ten standard deviations above the counterfactual mean in a given year. Even after conditioning the criteria on both the number of unmatched infraction records and the percentage of their overall infractions reported, there were still 130 troopers with significant discrepancies. We determined that the trooper with the largest discrepancy had 1,350 infraction records that were likely false and inaccurate submitted between 2014 and 2017. There were 22 troopers with more than 200 infraction records overreported during the audit period. Of these 22 troopers, 10 were still submitting traffic stop records in 2021, meaning that they were still employed with CSP. Additionally, there were 21 troopers in 2021 that were more than two standard deviations above the mean for overreported infractions. The total number of troopers identified has declined each year. However, even after CSP discovered the problem

in late 2018, a small group of troopers continued to have a significant number of overreported infractions.

***Underreported Racial Profiling Records:***

In addition to reviewing records that were overreported and likely false and inaccurate by troopers, researchers also reviewed the 672,184 infractions reported to the Centralized Infractions Bureau between January 1, 2015, and December 31, 2021. We excluded 2014 from this analysis because we were unable to determine infractions that resulted from a crash. We were able to identify if an infraction was written for a non-traffic-related violation or as part of a crash investigation. Once identified, these infractions were removed from the analysis. Using the matching criteria outlined in our methodology and only considering data between 2015 and 2021, we are left with 16,298 infractions in the CIB database without a corresponding record in the racial profiling database. It is challenging to fully understand the extent of possible underreporting in the racial profiling database, but it appears that at least some records are not being reported to the racial profiling database that should be.

Between 2015 and 2021, approximately 2.5% of all infraction records submitted by troopers to the CIB database were likely underreported. These records were found every year during the audit period. In the aggregate, HQ, Troop H, and Troop F have the most underreported records.

Of the 1,301 troopers we audited, 542 had a significant number of underreported records in at least one year of the audit. There were 106 troopers with more than 25 underreported records in a given year, which is more than 13 standard deviations above the counterfactual mean. After conditioning the criteria on both the number of underreported infraction records and the percentage of their overall infractions underreported, there were 192 troopers with significant discrepancies. The total number of troopers identified has declined each year. However, even after CSP discovered the problem in late 2018, a small group of troopers continued to have a significant number of underreported infractions.

**VI.B: Summary of Constable Audit Findings**

***Overreported Racial Profiling Records:***

Researchers reviewed 38,528 infractions submitted by 373 constables between January 1, 2014, and December 31, 2021. We were unable to audit stops that resulted in other dispositions such as a warning. Based on our criteria, we found at least 7,427 traffic stops that were likely overreported to the racial profiling database. We believe that at least some of the 7,427 traffic stop records submitted to the racial profiling database are false and inaccurate. Our methodology allowed for an extremely loose matching criterion and the number of false records is likely larger than we can confidently identify.

Between 2014 and 2021, approximately 19% of all infraction records submitted by constables to the racial profiling database were overreported. These records were found every year during the audit period. The largest percentage of overreported records was in 2019. Although the share of overreported records improved in 2020 and 2021, there were still between 13 and 15% of all infractions that were overreported.

Constables in towns within the boundaries of Troops A, E, and F had the most significant discrepancies. This was unsurprising given that these areas have the largest number of constables. Constables in Montville had the largest number of overreported infractions with more than 34% of infractions overreported. Constables in Troop F had the second largest number of overreported infractions, although they had the third largest percentage of infractions overreported. We have a high degree of confidence based on the data analysis that there was a pattern and practice of submitting false and inaccurate records to the racial profiling database in constable towns within Troops A, E, and F.

Of the 373 constables we audited, 76 had significant discrepancies in the number of overreported infraction records in at least one year of the audit. The majority of constables identified (58) were more than three standard deviations above the counterfactual mean and 15 constables were more than 12 standard deviations above the counterfactual mean in a given year. Even after conditioning the criteria on both the number of unmatched infraction records and the percentage of their overall infractions reported, there were still 63 constables with significant discrepancies. There were 20 constables with more than 100 infraction records overreported during the audit period. Of these 20 constables, 15 were still submitting traffic stop records in 2021, meaning that they were still employed as constables. Additionally, there were 9 constables in 2021 that were more than two standard deviations above the mean for overreported infractions. The total number of constables identified has declined each year. However, even after CSP discovered the problem in late 2018, a small group of constables continued to have a significant number of overreported infractions.

#### ***Underreported Racial Profiling Records:***

In addition to reviewing records that were overreported by constables, researchers also reviewed the 38,420 infractions reported to the Centralized Infractions Bureau between January 1, 2014, and December 31, 2021. We determined that at least 1,861 infractions were for non-moving violations. Unfortunately, we were unable to account for infractions issued by a constable during a crash. We determined that 7,319 infractions submitted to the CIB database could have been issued during a traffic stop or crash. Only infractions issued during a traffic stop need to be reported to the racial profiling database. If we assume that constables issue infractions during a crash at the same rate as troopers, we are still left with 3,093 infractions that should have been reported to the racial profiling database. We believe that at least some of the 7,319 CIB records should have necessitated the completion of a racial profiling form.

Due to the reporting issues for constables, we were less confident in our individual constable analysis of underreported racial profiling records. That being said, there were 16 constables with more than 100 underreported infractions during the audit period. Even if we assume that half of their underreported records were related to a crash, these 16 constables still have a significant number of underreported records. We believe that the issue of underreported racial profiling records by constables warrants further review by the Connecticut State Police.

### **VI.C: Summary of Impact on Racial Profiling Reports**

Since 2015, data submitted to the racial profiling database has been evaluated to determine if there are statistically significant racial and ethnic disparities in traffic stops. We rely on all police officers accurately and honestly reporting data to the racial profiling system. Therefore, we needed to



evaluate whether the records submitted that were likely false and inaccurate could have had an impact on our annual analysis. We also needed to evaluate whether records that were underreported to the system may have impacted the analysis if they had been reported. We were unable to assess the impact that constables had on any of the annual analyses. However, constables contribute less than 5% of all stops reported by state police, and any discrepancies from constables likely had little or no impact on the racial profiling studies.

This analysis suggests that the demographics recorded in the unmatched and potentially fraudulent racial profiling records has most likely had a substantive and statistically significant impact on statistics and empirical tests related to the share of racial and ethnic minority motorists stopped. The audit determined that unmatched racial profiling records where we have a high degree of confidence that the data is false and inaccurate submitted by troopers were more likely to be reported as White and less likely to be reported as Black or Hispanic. Records that were underreported by troopers were more likely to be Hispanic or some other race and less likely to be White.

#### **VI.D: Recommendations**

The primary purpose of these recommendations is to address the circumstances through which a pattern of unreliable or misleading traffic stop data was able to be introduced into the racial profiling system by CSP. Some of the circumstances that existed which led to the current situation are structural in nature while others are more related to human performance issues.

It seems clear that it would be in the best interest of the agency to review some of its policies and practices with an eye to improving the way its traffic stop records are processed and reported. Greater attention to how traffic records are created and submitted to the racial profiling system will benefit both the quality of the analysis and assure that CSP supervisors are relying on the most accurate records when conducting their periodic evaluations of personnel performance. Some of the issues identified in this audit may require CSP command staff to reinforce with troopers and constables the need for accurately and honestly submitting the required traffic stop records not only because such records are being reviewed for accuracy but also because engaging in submitting false or misleading records carries serious consequences under state law for those who engage in it. Recommendations are outlined below.

1. The serious nature of submitting false or misleading traffic stop records can have consequences beyond the Alvin W. Penn law. CSP should immediately reinforce to all current troopers and constables the consequences that exist under state law for those found to be submitting unsubstantiated or fictitious records intended to mislead either supervisors or the racial profiling data review system.

We identified troopers and constables with statistically significant discrepancies that were strongly indicative of a pattern of submitting false and inaccurate racial profiling records in at least one year of the audit. The majority of these troopers and constables were more than three standard deviations above the counterfactual mean. There were still a small group of troopers and constables that were more than two standard deviations above the mean in 2021. At the same time, we also identified troopers that likely underreported a significant number of stops to the racial profiling system in at least one year of the audit. There were troopers that were more than two standard deviations above the mean for underreported racial profiling records in 2021.

All CSP personnel must understand that the accuracy of the records they submit is a cornerstone to maintaining public trust and is scrutinized by several governmental and public entities. Failure to meet the expected standards has significant legal and career consequences. In truth, the loss of faith in an officer's integrity in the performance of duties is far more damaging than anything the data they are required to submit might reveal.

2. Timely supervisory review of records submitted by troopers is the key to assuring the continuing accuracy of traffic stop records. The expectations for troop commanders and supervisory staff must be reviewed regarding the importance of record accuracy for all those under their supervision. Supervisors must ensure that all personnel meet agency standards for the accurate reporting of information.

The audit results suggest a longer-term issue with traffic stop record accuracy than the agency was able to identify and address in 2018. Since 2018, the situation uncovered in Troop E has markedly improved but some of the other troops have been slower to respond to the urgency of the issue. While all troops have shown reporting discrepancies at one time or another, the issue has been much more prevalent in some troops than others, which suggests a lack of uniformity in the way troop supervisors may perceive and approach the issue of record accuracy. CSP command staff can and should address this lack of uniformity between troops with clear guidance and objectives for troop supervisors. Steps can be taken to give troop supervisors tools to integrate record accuracy checks as part of their ongoing duties and periodic staff performance evaluations.

3. An independent record of all traffic stops communicated to dispatch should be retained in the dispatch log.

It is our understanding that troopers and constables are required to call all stops into dispatch. This is generally a good policy to ensure the safety of the officer. However, when requested, CSP was unable to provide a record of stops called into dispatch which suggests that these communications between officers and dispatch either are not always occurring or are not routinely maintained as part of the dispatch records. If there was a record of all stops, regardless of the stop disposition, it would be much easier to conduct a comprehensive audit. The lack of an independent record maintained by dispatchers in a dispatch log means that for all practical purposes, we were only able to audit stops that resulted in an infraction.

A growing concern we have is our ability to comprehensively audit all CSP records, especially as we have seen a significant change in the outcome of stops in the last three years. Between 2014 and 2020, 67% of stops made by CSP resulted in an infraction compared to 26% of stops that resulted in a warning. However, beginning in 2021 and 2022, the proportion of CSP stops resulting in infractions has declined dramatically. In 2021, only 45% of stops made by CSP resulted in an infraction compared to 47% of stops that resulted in a warning. While the overall number of traffic stops conducted by CSP dropped significantly due to the COVID pandemic, and possibly other factors, 2021 was the first time that CSP issued more warnings than infractions. The apparent decrease in the number of unsubstantiated stop records in recent years and the shift toward more warning outcomes in stops overlap to an extent, but we cannot determine if they are related. Regardless, if the trend toward more warnings than infractions persist, it will become increasingly difficult to audit CSP records for accuracy in the absence of some independent way to verify stops that don't result in an infraction.

4. The CSP command staff should reevaluate how case numbers are issued.

In many municipal police departments, the dispatcher provides the officer with a case number or traffic stop number following each stop. A number is assigned by the dispatcher after the officer provides dispatch with information about the stop and that information is recorded in the dispatch log. One benefit of this approach is that it makes it more challenging for an officer who might be inclined or motivated to create a false stop record to do so without involving a third party in the transaction, i.e., the dispatcher.

CSP has outlined a number of constraints that currently prevent them from moving to this model. In particular, there are a limited number of dispatchers that are fielding a high volume of calls. Allowing CSP troopers to issue their own case number and thus have direct access to the RMS database certainly has its efficiencies for an agency with its size and activity level. But it also appears to provide the opportunity for officers who are inclined and motivated to manipulate the system to do so with relative ease. The internal affairs investigation of the four Troop E troopers in 2018 uncovered the practice of these troopers to issue themselves a case number for fictitious stops as a way of artificially enhancing their performance records. There was no need for them to call the fictitious stops into dispatch because dispatch does not control the data being entered by issuance of a case number. While CSP may have no practical way to eliminate this vulnerability, it should consider whatever measures might reduce this vulnerability.

5. Whenever troopers or constables enter a traffic stop into the system that results in an infraction, the infraction ticket number should also be part of the data entered in the NexGen records management system.

Our audit seems to identify a pattern of record manipulation by a segment of the trooper and constable force that both predates and goes well beyond the actions of the four troopers identified in 2018. Considering ways to constrain this pathway to manipulate stop records would tighten the “information chain” between officers and supervisors.

Every infraction, whether electronic or handwritten, is assigned a ticket number. This number is used by the judicial branch to track infractions within the judicial system. Currently, CSP can record the ticket number for all electronic tickets issued. However, they do not record the ticket number for handwritten tickets, even though the paper tickets contain pre-printed numbers. Our audit found that matching RMS case numbers (maintained by CSP) and infraction ticket numbers (maintained by CIB) was the fastest and most effective way to match reported infraction stops to infractions actually being adjudicated by the Judicial Branch. Going forward, future audits of CSP data can be conducted much more quickly and accurately if the ticket number was accessible through the entire information chain between the agency, judicial, and racial profiling databases. This would also make it easier for CSP supervisors to have more timely reviews of record accuracy.

6. Provide clear guidance and training to troopers regarding the proper reporting of stops made involving a commercial vehicle.

The original guidance provided to law enforcement exempted the reporting of stop activity that occurred during a weigh station operation. Some traffic stops of commercial vehicles are being coded in the CSP records management system as “TSCOMM” (traffic stop commercial) which exempts the troopers from completing the racial profiling data. Traffic stops involving commercial vehicles must be reported to the racial profiling system, except when the activity occurs as part of a weigh station

operation. For example, if a trooper conducts a traffic stop of a commercial vehicle for speeding and decides to also conduct a safety inspection, racial profiling information must be reported. There were stops coded as TSCOMM where the infraction was issued for violations that clearly had to stem from the observation of a violation through routine traffic enforcement.

7. The advisory board should consider having CTRP3 staff conduct an annual audit of CSP data for at least the next three calendar years.


The findings outlined in this report warrant at least an annual audit of CSP data until the CTRP3 advisory board is confident in the accuracy of the data being reported. We recommend that the CTRP3 staff conduct an annual audit for at least the next three calendar years or longer if problems with data reliability persist or new issues arise. Such a mandate would be helpful in assessing the changing nature of the CSP data, and in particular, if the current shift in the CSP data from infraction stop outcomes to warning outcomes continues.

## **APPENDIX A: TROOPER ANALYSIS FIGURES**


**A.1: OVERREPORTED RACIAL PROFILING RECORDS BY TROOP AND YEAR**

Figures A.1 through A.8 are the aggregate ratio of overreported records submitted to the racial profiling system by troop for each calendar year.


**Figure A. 1: Overreported Racial Profiling Records by Troop (2014)**




**Figure A. 2: Overreported Racial Profiling Records by Troop (2015)**




**Figure A. 3: Overreported Racial Profiling Records by Troop (2016)**




**Figure A. 4: Overreported Racial Profiling Records by Troop (2017)**




**Figure A. 5: Overreported Racial Profiling Records by Troop (2018)**




**Figure A. 6: Overreported Racial Profiling Records by Troop (2019)**



**Figure A. 7: Overreported Racial Profiling Records by Troop (2020)**



**Figure A. 8: Overreported Racial Profiling Records by Troop (2021)**







## A.2: UNDERREPORTED RACIAL PROFILING RECORDS BY TROOP AND YEAR

Figures A.9 through A.15 are the aggregate ratio of underreported records submitted to the CIB database and not to the racial profiling database by troop for each calendar year.


**Figure A. 9: Underreported CIB Records by Troop (2015)**




**Figure A. 10: Underreported CIB Records by Troop (2016)**




**Figure A. 11: Underreported CIB Records by Troop (2017)**




**Figure A. 12: Underreported CIB Records by Troop (2018)**




**Figure A. 13: Underreported CIB Records by Troop (2019)**



**Figure A. 14: Underreported CIB Records by Troop (2020)**



**Figure A. 15: Underreported CIB Records by Troop (2021)**




## **APPENDIX B: CONSTABLE ANALYSIS FIGURES**


### B.1: OVERREPORTED RACIAL PROFILING RECORDS BY TROOP AND YEAR

Figures B.1 through B.8 are the aggregate ratio of overreported records submitted to the racial profiling system by constables within troop boundaries for each calendar year.


**Figure B. 1: Overreported Racial Profiling Records by Troop (2014)**




**Figure B. 2: Overreported Racial Profiling Records by Troop (2015)**




**Figure B. 3: Overreported Racial Profiling Records by Troop (2016)**




**Figure B. 4: Overreported Racial Profiling Records by Troop (2017)**




**Figure B. 5: Overreported Racial Profiling Records by Troop (2018)**



**Figure B. 6: Overreported Racial Profiling Records by Troop (2019)**



**Figure B. 7: Overreported Racial Profiling Records by Troop (2020)**



**Figure B. 8: Overreported Racial Profiling Records by Troop (2021)**

