34. Letter From Prime Minister Eden to President Eisenhower1

Dear Friend: I am so happy to hear that you are back at the White House again.2 This tempts me to send you some thoughts on the future of NATO which have been in my mind for some time.

2.

I am fully in sympathy with the current project for improving the political cohesion of the Organisation,3 but I am sure that this alone will not suffice. It was on the military aspects of the alliance that the strength of the Organisation was founded; and its military policy must command public confidence if its authority is to be maintained.

3.

As it seems to me the strategic situation has been evolving since the development of the thermo-nuclear weapon. Two new factors have now been introduced. First, both sides now stand possessed of this weapon, and each now realises the devastation which its use would involve. Second, and perhaps as important, public opinion throughout the democracies has begun to realise that the danger of major war has for this reason receded and that the nature of such a war, if it came, would be very different from anything we have [Page 91] known hitherto. As this understanding deepens there is bound to be a growing reluctance, among the peoples of the free world, to accept the social and human sacrifices required for the maintenance of large forces of the conventional pattern.

4.

It can be argued that even the Russians are adjusting the balance of their resources. They are certainly doing everything they can to develop the most up-to-date weapons and the means of delivering them. From this it is pretty clear that they believe in the power of the deterrent. Having taken that decision they have decided, it seems to me, to increase their labour force for industrial expansion and correspondingly to reduce their conventional military forces. They are skillfully making the maximum propaganda use of this decision.

5.

We have surely to take account of these new elements in the situation. Some no doubt will say that these considerations lead to the logical conclusion that you, at any rate, and perhaps we, should fall back on a peripheral defense. This is not my view. I feel sure it would not be yours. The maintenance of independence and freedom in Western Europe is essential to any policy designed to preserve our free way of life in the world. You know, better than anyone, how the increasing military strength of the North Atlantic Alliance helped to build up political stability in Western Europe, for you did it. It was the forces in being under NATO Command, and particularly the presence of United States and British forces in Europe, that gave confidence and courage to those who were ready to resist political encroachment by Communism in Europe. Or to put it another way: the political cohesion of the Western European countries in resisting the internal threat of Communism was inspired by growing confidence in the military side of the Alliance. The political need to maintain the solidarity of the European countries is as strong as ever. For this purpose, even if for no other, it would still be important that some United States and British forces should remain on the ground in Europe under NATO Command.

6.

The military purpose for which these forces are now required are, however, different from those on which the military policy of NATO was first framed. It was originally designed to meet the threat of a Soviet land invasion, and its pattern was established before the advent of the nuclear weapon. Today, the situation is changing. It is on the thermo-nuclear bomb and atomic weapons that we now rely, not only to deter aggression, but to deal with aggression if it should be launched. A “shield” of conventional forces is still required; but it is no longer our principal military protection. Need it be capable of fighting a major land battle? Its primary military function seems now to be to deal with any local infiltration, to prevent external intimidation and to enable aggression to be identified as such. It may be that it should also be capable of imposing some delay on the progress of a [Page 92] Soviet land invasion until the full impact is felt of the thermo-nuclear retaliation which would be launched against the Soviet Union.

7.

The application of this concept would, I think, involve significant changes in the shape and size of the NATO forces, and possibly in their deployment. It would certainly have a profound effect on existing plans for reserve forces and for logistic support. I believe that it could lead to a reduction in the numbers of conventional forces stationed in Germany—though I should not wish such a reduction to be carried below the levels necessary to serve the political objectives outlined in paragraph 5 above. A reappraisal of the military policy of NATO along these lines is, I believe, necessary and urgent. It is necessary on its merits. It is urgent because we believe that NATO will not continue to command public confidence unless it shows its ability to adjust its policies to accord with changing circumstances and, as I have said, I doubt whether the peoples of the free world will be willing to go on bearing the heavy burden of defense programmes unless they are satisfied that these are directed realistically towards the new situation.

8.

Much of this, as you know, was put by Roger Makins to Foster last month.4 His reaction was most helpful. Since then we have had useful and encouraging conversations here in London with Al Gruenther.5 But above all I have now been greatly heartened to hear that you are yourself proposing to take a hand in all this next month. Big decisions will be called for and maybe we shall have to take some risks if we are to carry our people with us and maintain public confidence in the Alliance. However, I am quite sure that this can be done and that we shall go forward together to shape the future as we have done the past. We have had many more difficult problems than this and as long as we are in step I have no doubt that we can handle this one without causing disarray. It is for this reason that I am writing to you now to let you know how my mind is working. I should be much encouraged if I could hear that you were in general agreement with this broad approach.

9.

I hope that you will enjoy your trip to Panama.6 Do not let any other kinds of Americans tire you too much.

Yours ever,